Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?

Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak...

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Main Authors: Damien Delorme, Noemi Calidori, Giovanni Frigo
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2024-01-01
Series:Philosophies
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/9/1/11
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author Damien Delorme
Noemi Calidori
Giovanni Frigo
author_facet Damien Delorme
Noemi Calidori
Giovanni Frigo
author_sort Damien Delorme
collection DOAJ
description Existing predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action.
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spelling doaj.art-7528e7bddf3242b0a8e564213355345e2024-02-23T15:31:29ZengMDPI AGPhilosophies2409-92872024-01-01911110.3390/philosophies9010011Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?Damien Delorme0Noemi Calidori1Giovanni Frigo2Faculty of Geosciences and Environment (FGSE), Institute of Geography and Sustainability (IGD), University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, SwitzerlandDepartment of Law, Roma Tre University, 00154 Rome, ItalyInstitute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS), Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), 76131 Karlsruhe, GermanyExisting predominant approaches within virtue ethics (VE) assume humans as the typical agent and virtues as dispositions that pertain primarily to human–human interpersonal relationships. Similarly, the main accounts in the more specific area of environmental virtue ethics (EVE) tend to support weak anthropocentric positions, in which virtues are understood as excellent dispositions of human agents. In addition, however, several EVE authors have also considered virtues that benefit non-human beings and entities (e.g., environmental or ecological virtues). The latter correspond to excellent character dispositions that would extend moral consideration and care for the benefit of non-human beings, entities, or entire ecosystems. In this direction, a few authors have argued that EVE could be considered non-anthropocentric insofar as it could: (a) promote non-human ends, well-being, and the flourishing of non-human beings and entities; (b) involve significant relations to non-humans. Drawing from different traditions, including ecofeminism and care ethics, we argue for a broader notion of self and a decentered notion of virtues. The broader notion of selfhood corresponds to the “ecological self”, one that can be enacted by both human and non-human beings, is embedded in a network of relations, and recognizes the more-than-human world as fundamental and yet indispensable otherness. We suggest that this broader notion of agency allows for an expansive understanding of virtues that includes a-moral functional ecological virtues, which can be exercised not only by humans but also by certain non-human beings. This alternative understanding of selfhood and ecological virtues within EVE could have several theoretical and practical implications, some of which may enable different types of agencies and transform collective action.https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/9/1/11ecological selfecofeminismcare ethicsenvironmental virtue ethicsnon-anthropocentrismecological virtues
spellingShingle Damien Delorme
Noemi Calidori
Giovanni Frigo
Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?
Philosophies
ecological self
ecofeminism
care ethics
environmental virtue ethics
non-anthropocentrism
ecological virtues
title Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?
title_full Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?
title_fullStr Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?
title_full_unstemmed Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?
title_short Ecological Virtuous Selves: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Environmental Virtue Ethic?
title_sort ecological virtuous selves towards a non anthropocentric environmental virtue ethic
topic ecological self
ecofeminism
care ethics
environmental virtue ethics
non-anthropocentrism
ecological virtues
url https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/9/1/11
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