A Note on the Lucas Argument
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv1.04 We’re talking about J. Anthony Lucas’s classic argument that Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem rules out man-machine equivalence. This is an argument that Penrose revived and popularized in the 1990s. This fallacious argument is a thoroughly dead hor...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Polskie Towarzystwo Semiotyczne / The Polish Semiotic Society
2020-11-01
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| Series: | Studia Semiotyczne |
| Online Access: | http://studiasemiotyczne.pts.edu.pl/index.php/Studiasemiotyczne/article/view/201 |
| Summary: | DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv1.04
We’re talking about J. Anthony Lucas’s classic argument that Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem rules out man-machine equivalence. This is an argument that Penrose revived and popularized in the 1990s. This fallacious argument is a thoroughly dead horse. But I’ll give it another beating here. Do note that the Lucas-Penrose argument is a completely distinct issue from PenroseHameroff speculation that the brain can act as a coherent quantum computer. It’s to Penrose’s credit that he’s associated with multiple controversial ideas! |
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| ISSN: | 0137-6608 2544-073X |