Deposit insurance and banking stability

Many countries provide extensive deposit insurance as a part of a safety net that promotes stability in the financial system. An unintended conequence of deposit insurance is that it reduces depositors’ incentives to supervise banks, leading to excessive risk-taking. The article discussed the rel...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Cyrine Snen
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: THOT Publishing House 2021-11-01
Series:Journal of Research and Innovation for Sustainable Society
Subjects:
Online Access:http://jriss.4ader.ro/pdf/2021-02/24_Ec.pdf
Description
Summary:Many countries provide extensive deposit insurance as a part of a safety net that promotes stability in the financial system. An unintended conequence of deposit insurance is that it reduces depositors’ incentives to supervise banks, leading to excessive risk-taking. The article discussed the relationship between deposit insurance, bank risks and systemic vulnerabilities before and during the Great Financial Crisis
ISSN:2668-0416