Deposit insurance and banking stability
Many countries provide extensive deposit insurance as a part of a safety net that promotes stability in the financial system. An unintended conequence of deposit insurance is that it reduces depositors’ incentives to supervise banks, leading to excessive risk-taking. The article discussed the rel...
Main Author: | Cyrine Snen |
---|---|
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
THOT Publishing House
2021-11-01
|
Series: | Journal of Research and Innovation for Sustainable Society |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://jriss.4ader.ro/pdf/2021-02/24_Ec.pdf |
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