Modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game
Abstract During a pandemic, isolating oneself from the community limits viral transmission and helps avoid repeated societal lockdowns. This entails a social dilemma—either distance oneself from others for the benefit of the public good or free-ride and enjoy the benefits of freedom. It is not yet u...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Nature Portfolio
2022-08-01
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| Series: | Scientific Reports |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-17642-w |
| _version_ | 1818504924012478464 |
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| author | Simon T. van Baal Lukasz Walasek Jakob Hohwy |
| author_facet | Simon T. van Baal Lukasz Walasek Jakob Hohwy |
| author_sort | Simon T. van Baal |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract During a pandemic, isolating oneself from the community limits viral transmission and helps avoid repeated societal lockdowns. This entails a social dilemma—either distance oneself from others for the benefit of the public good or free-ride and enjoy the benefits of freedom. It is not yet understood how the unfamiliar incentive structure and interpersonal context presented by a pandemic together modulate individuals’ approach to this social dilemma. In this preregistered study, we take a game-theoretical approach and investigate people’s decisions to self-isolate, using a novel iterated multiplayer game designed to capture the decision-making environment in the pandemic. To elucidate players’ thinking, we use a variation of the strategy method and elicit beliefs about how much others will self-isolate. Players tend to respond to social norms with abidance, rather than transgression; they resist the temptation to freeride when others are self-isolating. However, they deal with exponential growth poorly, as they only self-isolate sufficiently when lockdowns are imminent. Further, increased collective risk can motivate more self-isolation, even though the link between self-isolation and lockdowns is stochastic. Players underreport the influence of others’ choices on their own, and underestimate others’ self-isolation. We discuss implications for public health, and communication to the public. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-10T21:43:47Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-76696a0172f14cbf8df7a327dee96fd8 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2045-2322 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-10T21:43:47Z |
| publishDate | 2022-08-01 |
| publisher | Nature Portfolio |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Scientific Reports |
| spelling | doaj.art-76696a0172f14cbf8df7a327dee96fd82022-12-22T01:32:25ZengNature PortfolioScientific Reports2045-23222022-08-0112111410.1038/s41598-022-17642-wModelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer gameSimon T. van Baal0Lukasz Walasek1Jakob Hohwy2Department of Psychology, University of WarwickDepartment of Psychology, University of WarwickCognition and Philosophy Lab, Monash UniversityAbstract During a pandemic, isolating oneself from the community limits viral transmission and helps avoid repeated societal lockdowns. This entails a social dilemma—either distance oneself from others for the benefit of the public good or free-ride and enjoy the benefits of freedom. It is not yet understood how the unfamiliar incentive structure and interpersonal context presented by a pandemic together modulate individuals’ approach to this social dilemma. In this preregistered study, we take a game-theoretical approach and investigate people’s decisions to self-isolate, using a novel iterated multiplayer game designed to capture the decision-making environment in the pandemic. To elucidate players’ thinking, we use a variation of the strategy method and elicit beliefs about how much others will self-isolate. Players tend to respond to social norms with abidance, rather than transgression; they resist the temptation to freeride when others are self-isolating. However, they deal with exponential growth poorly, as they only self-isolate sufficiently when lockdowns are imminent. Further, increased collective risk can motivate more self-isolation, even though the link between self-isolation and lockdowns is stochastic. Players underreport the influence of others’ choices on their own, and underestimate others’ self-isolation. We discuss implications for public health, and communication to the public.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-17642-w |
| spellingShingle | Simon T. van Baal Lukasz Walasek Jakob Hohwy Modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game Scientific Reports |
| title | Modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game |
| title_full | Modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game |
| title_fullStr | Modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game |
| title_full_unstemmed | Modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game |
| title_short | Modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game |
| title_sort | modelling pandemic behaviour using an economic multiplayer game |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-17642-w |
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