| Summary: | Theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and to others, is a multifaceted phenomenon as there are different kinds of mental states (intention, knowledge, belief, etc.). Is theory of mind present in other animals, particularly in nonhuman primates, or is it unique to humans? This question has been investigated for almost 40 years and, despite some methodological difficulties and controversies (e.g. mindreading vs. behavior-reading), important advances have been made since the early 2000s. In fact, we now know that great apes behave according to others’ goals, intentions, visual perspective, and knowledge, and, to a lesser extent it seems, to others’ auditory perspective. Furthermore, recent studies suggest that these hominids also understand false beliefs, albeit implicitly, a capacity that was previously thought to be found only in humans. Understanding false-belief is central to theory of mind as it requires one’s to realize that mental states are internal representations rather than direct reflections of reality, and can therefore be inaccurate. Future investigations should explain the discrepancies between these recent studies and previous ones which reported negative results, and should also clarify the nature of the difficulties experienced by great apes when it comes to reality-incongruent mental states. Although noteworthy efforts have been made, research is still mostly centered around great apes, especially chimpanzees, so much so that we still know very little about theory of mind abilities in other primates. Visual and auditory perspective-taking have nevertheless been reported in some Old World monkeys, as well as their understanding that knowledge is acquired through these sensory modalities. Some work has also shown ability to attribute goals and intentions to others in New World monkeys. Thus, what seemed to be a difference of kind between humans and other primates now appears to be mainly one of degree.
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