Optimization of Risk-sharing in Buyback Contracts Based on the Application of Agency Theory
Pricing and risk sharing in oil and gas service contracts such as buyback has always been the most important challenges in the contracting design. Asymmetric information leads to agency costs such as moral hazard and adverse selection and the process of contracting is complicated. In this paper, by...
Main Authors: | Seyed Mohammadreza Seyednourani, Mohammad Alimoradi |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | fas |
Published: |
Allameh Tabataba'i University Press
2015-06-01
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Series: | Pizhūhishnāmah-i Iqtiṣād-i Inirzhī-i Īrān |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://jiee.atu.ac.ir/article_1883_8fa07212512c7a1c855c599af3e444f7.pdf |
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