Escepticismo semántico y teorías del significado
In several works H. Putnam has developed an argument addressed against "realist" semantic theories (in particular, against causal theories of reference ). In this paper I argue that Putnam's argument is weaker than what is generally supposed, as Devitt has shown in Realism and Truth....
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico (SADAF)
1998-11-01
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| Series: | Análisis Filosófico |
| Online Access: | https://analisisfilosofico.org/index.php/af/article/view/587/427 |
| Summary: | In several works H. Putnam has developed an argument addressed against "realist" semantic theories (in particular, against causal theories of reference ). In this paper I argue that Putnam's argument is weaker than what is generally supposed, as Devitt has shown in Realism and Truth. I disagree, however, with Devitfs latest strategy against model-theoretic arguments as presented in an ''Afterword'' to that book. |
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| ISSN: | 0326-1301 1851-9636 |