The Social Impact Theory of Law
Margaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well”...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016-04-01
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| Series: | Phenomenology and Mind |
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| Online Access: | https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7220 |
| _version_ | 1818891434406707200 |
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| author | Joshua Keton |
| author_facet | Joshua Keton |
| author_sort | Joshua Keton |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Margaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well” (Gilbert 2013, p. 1). Herein I argue that Mark Greenberg’s recent call to eliminate the problem of legal normativity is well motivated. Further, I argue that Gilbert’s work on joint commitment, and more specifically obligations of joint commitment, allows us to move beyond the problem of legal normativity while cashing out H.L.A. Hart’s thesis that moral and legal obligations are distinct. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-19T17:40:45Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-78b0d192c8bf4f0388a1ba5d26161bc4 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2280-7853 2239-4028 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-19T17:40:45Z |
| publishDate | 2016-04-01 |
| publisher | Rosenberg & Sellier |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Phenomenology and Mind |
| spelling | doaj.art-78b0d192c8bf4f0388a1ba5d26161bc42022-12-21T20:12:13ZengRosenberg & SellierPhenomenology and Mind2280-78532239-40282016-04-01910.13128/Phe_Mi-1815815162The Social Impact Theory of LawJoshua KetonMargaret Gilbert’s work on sociality covers a wide range of topics, and as she puts it “addresses matters of great significance to several philosophical specialties – including ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, philosophy of science, and philosophy of law – and outside philosophy as well” (Gilbert 2013, p. 1). Herein I argue that Mark Greenberg’s recent call to eliminate the problem of legal normativity is well motivated. Further, I argue that Gilbert’s work on joint commitment, and more specifically obligations of joint commitment, allows us to move beyond the problem of legal normativity while cashing out H.L.A. Hart’s thesis that moral and legal obligations are distinct.https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7220legal normativityHart-Dworkin debatelegal positivisminterpretivism |
| spellingShingle | Joshua Keton The Social Impact Theory of Law Phenomenology and Mind legal normativity Hart-Dworkin debate legal positivism interpretivism |
| title | The Social Impact Theory of Law |
| title_full | The Social Impact Theory of Law |
| title_fullStr | The Social Impact Theory of Law |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Social Impact Theory of Law |
| title_short | The Social Impact Theory of Law |
| title_sort | social impact theory of law |
| topic | legal normativity Hart-Dworkin debate legal positivism interpretivism |
| url | https://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7220 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT joshuaketon thesocialimpacttheoryoflaw AT joshuaketon socialimpacttheoryoflaw |