Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
A set of coalition structures P is farsightedly stable (i) if all possible deviations from any coalition structure p belonging to P to a coalition structure outside P are deterred by the threat of ending worse off or equally well off, (ii) if there exists a farsighted improvingpath from any coalitio...
Main Authors: | Vincent Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, P. Jean-Jacques Herings |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
MDPI AG
2010-09-01
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Series: | Games |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/1/3/286/ |
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