Management’s choice of tone in letters to shareholders: sincerity, bias and incentives
This paper aims to identify the drivers of management reporting choices in a setting characterized by ownership concentration and weak enforcement. Previous research indicates, that tone of the letter to shareholders is correlated with performance. However, tone can be biased towards the positive wh...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Universidad de Murcia
2021-07-01
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| Series: | Revista de Contabilidad: Spanish Accounting Review |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://revistas.um.es/rcsar/article/view/393181 |
| Summary: | This paper aims to identify the drivers of management reporting choices in a setting characterized by ownership concentration and weak enforcement. Previous research indicates, that tone of the letter to shareholders is correlated with performance. However, tone can be biased towards the positive when a company is highly responsive to stock market incentives or controlled by majority investors. Bias can be reduced by the monitoring activities of institutional investors in closely held companies. There are two major implications of the study. First, when managers bias the text, they lose the ability to communicate positive news about their company. Under rational expectations investors can detect bias based on known situational incentives and disregard the biased information. Second, the results suggest that managers manipulate tone strategically, rather than unconsciously, to satisfy the needs of key shareholder groups. |
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| ISSN: | 1138-4891 1988-4672 |