Investigating Profiled Side-Channel Attacks Against the DES Key Schedule

Investigating Profiled Side-Channel Attacks Against the DES Key Schedule

Recent publications describe profiled single trace side-channel attacks (SCAs) against the DES key-schedule of a “commercially available security controller”. They report a significant reduction of the average remaining entropy of cryptographic keys after the attack, with surprisingly large, key-dep...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Johann Heyszl, Katja Miller, Florian Unterstein, Marc Schink, Alexander Wagner, Horst Gieser, Sven Freud, Tobias Damm, Dominik Klein, Dennis Kügler
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Ruhr-Universität Bochum 2020-06-01
Series:Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Subjects:
DES
3-DES
SCA
side-channel attack
key schedule
weak keys
Online Access:https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8582

Internet

https://tches.iacr.org/index.php/TCHES/article/view/8582

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