Security Analysis of an Identity-Based Signature From Factorization Problem
Many sensitive data are generated by resource-limitation devices in the Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). When these data are divulged, people 's life and property will be threatened. To solve these problems, Wei et al. proposed a lightweight privacy-preserving protocol based on RSA assumption...
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Language: | English |
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IEEE
2020-01-01
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Series: | IEEE Access |
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Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8950107/ |
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author | Ganglin Zhang Yongjian Liao Yu Fan Yikuan Liang |
author_facet | Ganglin Zhang Yongjian Liao Yu Fan Yikuan Liang |
author_sort | Ganglin Zhang |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Many sensitive data are generated by resource-limitation devices in the Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). When these data are divulged, people 's life and property will be threatened. To solve these problems, Wei et al. proposed a lightweight privacy-preserving protocol based on RSA assumption for VANET and they claimed that their protocol was secure and low overhead. In this paper, first of all, we show that the basic signature scheme to be used in Wei et al.'s protocol is not secure, i.e., the user's private key will be revealed from the pairs of message-signatures, which causes the protocol to be insecure. We also show that our security analysis is feasible and effective in practice from the theory and experiments. Then we construct a new identity-based signature scheme based RSA assumption and prove it is existentially unforgeable under the chosen message attack without random oracle. Finally, we update the Wei et al.'s protocol and do some experiments to evaluate the efficiency of our scheme in the updated protocol. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-17T05:42:48Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-7ae5c52327644664b3e2628afccf029c |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2169-3536 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-17T05:42:48Z |
publishDate | 2020-01-01 |
publisher | IEEE |
record_format | Article |
series | IEEE Access |
spelling | doaj.art-7ae5c52327644664b3e2628afccf029c2022-12-21T22:01:23ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362020-01-018232772328310.1109/ACCESS.2020.29640408950107Security Analysis of an Identity-Based Signature From Factorization ProblemGanglin Zhang0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0045-9204Yongjian Liao1https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3139-8528Yu Fan2https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8053-3816Yikuan Liang3https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6810-2319School of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, ChinaSchool of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, ChinaSchool of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, ChinaSchool of Information and Software Engineering, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, ChinaMany sensitive data are generated by resource-limitation devices in the Vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). When these data are divulged, people 's life and property will be threatened. To solve these problems, Wei et al. proposed a lightweight privacy-preserving protocol based on RSA assumption for VANET and they claimed that their protocol was secure and low overhead. In this paper, first of all, we show that the basic signature scheme to be used in Wei et al.'s protocol is not secure, i.e., the user's private key will be revealed from the pairs of message-signatures, which causes the protocol to be insecure. We also show that our security analysis is feasible and effective in practice from the theory and experiments. Then we construct a new identity-based signature scheme based RSA assumption and prove it is existentially unforgeable under the chosen message attack without random oracle. Finally, we update the Wei et al.'s protocol and do some experiments to evaluate the efficiency of our scheme in the updated protocol.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8950107/Common modulus attacksecurity analysisVANETs privacy-preservingIBS |
spellingShingle | Ganglin Zhang Yongjian Liao Yu Fan Yikuan Liang Security Analysis of an Identity-Based Signature From Factorization Problem IEEE Access Common modulus attack security analysis VANETs privacy-preserving IBS |
title | Security Analysis of an Identity-Based Signature From Factorization Problem |
title_full | Security Analysis of an Identity-Based Signature From Factorization Problem |
title_fullStr | Security Analysis of an Identity-Based Signature From Factorization Problem |
title_full_unstemmed | Security Analysis of an Identity-Based Signature From Factorization Problem |
title_short | Security Analysis of an Identity-Based Signature From Factorization Problem |
title_sort | security analysis of an identity based signature from factorization problem |
topic | Common modulus attack security analysis VANETs privacy-preserving IBS |
url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8950107/ |
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