Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams
Hydropower facilities are often remotely monitored or controlled from a centralized remote control room. Additionally, major component manufacturers monitor the performance of installed components, increasingly via public communication infrastructures. While these communications enable efficiencies...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-12-01
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| Series: | Sensors |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/23/24/9818 |
| _version_ | 1827573568168263680 |
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| author | Adrien Green Jeremy Lawrence George Siopsis Nicholas A. Peters Ali Passian |
| author_facet | Adrien Green Jeremy Lawrence George Siopsis Nicholas A. Peters Ali Passian |
| author_sort | Adrien Green |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Hydropower facilities are often remotely monitored or controlled from a centralized remote control room. Additionally, major component manufacturers monitor the performance of installed components, increasingly via public communication infrastructures. While these communications enable efficiencies and increased reliability, they also expand the cyber-attack surface. Communications may use the internet to remote control a facility’s control systems, or it may involve sending control commands over a network from a control room to a machine. The content could be encrypted and decrypted using a public key to protect the communicated information. These cryptographic encoding and decoding schemes become vulnerable as more advances are made in computer technologies, such as quantum computing. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) and other quantum cryptographic protocols are not based upon a computational problem, and offer an alternative to symmetric cryptography in some scenarios. Although the underlying mechanism of quantum cryptogrpahic protocols such as QKD ensure that any attempt by an adversary to observe the quantum part of the protocol will result in a detectable signature as an increased error rate, potentially even preventing key generation, it serves as a warning for further investigation. In QKD, when the error rate is low enough and enough photons have been detected, a shared private key can be generated known only to the sender and receiver. We describe how this novel technology and its several modalities could benefit the critical infrastructures of dams or hydropower facilities. The presented discussions may be viewed as a precursor to a quantum cybersecurity roadmap for the identification of relevant threats and mitigation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T20:23:06Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7b62f14be5d14f6fb0559e96bba049f7 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1424-8220 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T20:23:06Z |
| publishDate | 2023-12-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Sensors |
| spelling | doaj.art-7b62f14be5d14f6fb0559e96bba049f72023-12-22T14:40:52ZengMDPI AGSensors1424-82202023-12-012324981810.3390/s23249818Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and DamsAdrien Green0Jeremy Lawrence1George Siopsis2Nicholas A. Peters3Ali Passian4Department of Physics and Astronomy, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USAElectric Power Research Institute, Charlotte, NC 28262, USADepartment of Physics and Astronomy, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USAQuantum Information Science Section, Computational Sciences and Engineering Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831, USAQuantum Information Science Section, Computational Sciences and Engineering Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, TN 37831, USAHydropower facilities are often remotely monitored or controlled from a centralized remote control room. Additionally, major component manufacturers monitor the performance of installed components, increasingly via public communication infrastructures. While these communications enable efficiencies and increased reliability, they also expand the cyber-attack surface. Communications may use the internet to remote control a facility’s control systems, or it may involve sending control commands over a network from a control room to a machine. The content could be encrypted and decrypted using a public key to protect the communicated information. These cryptographic encoding and decoding schemes become vulnerable as more advances are made in computer technologies, such as quantum computing. In contrast, quantum key distribution (QKD) and other quantum cryptographic protocols are not based upon a computational problem, and offer an alternative to symmetric cryptography in some scenarios. Although the underlying mechanism of quantum cryptogrpahic protocols such as QKD ensure that any attempt by an adversary to observe the quantum part of the protocol will result in a detectable signature as an increased error rate, potentially even preventing key generation, it serves as a warning for further investigation. In QKD, when the error rate is low enough and enough photons have been detected, a shared private key can be generated known only to the sender and receiver. We describe how this novel technology and its several modalities could benefit the critical infrastructures of dams or hydropower facilities. The presented discussions may be viewed as a precursor to a quantum cybersecurity roadmap for the identification of relevant threats and mitigation.https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/23/24/9818quantum key distributionQKDquantum securityhydropowerdamsQKD post-processing |
| spellingShingle | Adrien Green Jeremy Lawrence George Siopsis Nicholas A. Peters Ali Passian Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams Sensors quantum key distribution QKD quantum security hydropower dams QKD post-processing |
| title | Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams |
| title_full | Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams |
| title_fullStr | Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams |
| title_full_unstemmed | Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams |
| title_short | Quantum Key Distribution for Critical Infrastructures: Towards Cyber-Physical Security for Hydropower and Dams |
| title_sort | quantum key distribution for critical infrastructures towards cyber physical security for hydropower and dams |
| topic | quantum key distribution QKD quantum security hydropower dams QKD post-processing |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/23/24/9818 |
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