Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence
Abstract A cyber‐physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks is outlined. The authors demonstrate that it is feasible to use small, low‐cost, yet highly attack‐resistant security chips as measurement nodes, enhanced with an event...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2021-03-01
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| Series: | IET Cyber-Physical Systems |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1049/cps2.12002 |
| _version_ | 1811280298684448768 |
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| author | Martin Higgins Keith Mayes Fei Teng |
| author_facet | Martin Higgins Keith Mayes Fei Teng |
| author_sort | Martin Higgins |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract A cyber‐physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks is outlined. The authors demonstrate that it is feasible to use small, low‐cost, yet highly attack‐resistant security chips as measurement nodes, enhanced with an event‐triggered moving target defence (MTD), to offer effective cyber‐physical security. At the cyber layer, the proposed solution is based on the MULTOS Trust‐Anchor chip, using an authenticated encryption protocol, offering cryptographically protected and chained reports at up to 12/s. The availability of the Trust‐Anchors allows the grid controller to delegate aspects of passive anomaly detection, supporting local as well as central alarms. In this context, a distributed event‐triggered MTD protocol is implemented at the physical layer to complement cyber side enhancement. This protocol applies a distributed anomaly detection scheme based on Holt‐Winters seasonal forecasting in combination with MTD implemented via inductance perturbation. The scheme is shown to be effective at preventing or detecting a wide range of attacks against power system measurement system. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T01:12:14Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7b6572c684a845daaf048297913eb1f3 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2398-3396 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T01:12:14Z |
| publishDate | 2021-03-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IET Cyber-Physical Systems |
| spelling | doaj.art-7b6572c684a845daaf048297913eb1f32022-12-22T03:09:07ZengWileyIET Cyber-Physical Systems2398-33962021-03-0161122610.1049/cps2.12002Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defenceMartin Higgins0Keith Mayes1Fei Teng2Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Imperial College London Exibition Road South Kensington London UKRoyal Holloway University of London Information Security Group Egham London UKDepartment of Electrical and Electronic Engineering Imperial College London Exibition Road South Kensington London UKAbstract A cyber‐physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks is outlined. The authors demonstrate that it is feasible to use small, low‐cost, yet highly attack‐resistant security chips as measurement nodes, enhanced with an event‐triggered moving target defence (MTD), to offer effective cyber‐physical security. At the cyber layer, the proposed solution is based on the MULTOS Trust‐Anchor chip, using an authenticated encryption protocol, offering cryptographically protected and chained reports at up to 12/s. The availability of the Trust‐Anchors allows the grid controller to delegate aspects of passive anomaly detection, supporting local as well as central alarms. In this context, a distributed event‐triggered MTD protocol is implemented at the physical layer to complement cyber side enhancement. This protocol applies a distributed anomaly detection scheme based on Holt‐Winters seasonal forecasting in combination with MTD implemented via inductance perturbation. The scheme is shown to be effective at preventing or detecting a wide range of attacks against power system measurement system.https://doi.org/10.1049/cps2.12002 |
| spellingShingle | Martin Higgins Keith Mayes Fei Teng Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence IET Cyber-Physical Systems |
| title | Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence |
| title_full | Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence |
| title_fullStr | Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence |
| title_short | Enhanced cyber‐physical security using attack‐resistant cyber nodes and event‐triggered moving target defence |
| title_sort | enhanced cyber physical security using attack resistant cyber nodes and event triggered moving target defence |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1049/cps2.12002 |
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