Market power risk prevention mechanism of China’s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
The construction of China’s power spot market is still in its early stage, with a high concentration on generation-side resources and frequent market power. It is urgent to establish risk prevention mechanisms for the generation of market power. First, the paper establishes a basic framework of the...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Energy Research |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2023.1270681/full |
| _version_ | 1797628025634816000 |
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| author | Jingdong Xie Bowen Guan Yin Yao Ruizhen Li Quan Shi |
| author_facet | Jingdong Xie Bowen Guan Yin Yao Ruizhen Li Quan Shi |
| author_sort | Jingdong Xie |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The construction of China’s power spot market is still in its early stage, with a high concentration on generation-side resources and frequent market power. It is urgent to establish risk prevention mechanisms for the generation of market power. First, the paper establishes a basic framework of the stochastic evolutionary game theory and then builds a “stochastic evolutionary game market-clearing” model for the market regulator and risk units. Second, the work provides a library of multi-dimensional monitoring and evaluation indicators for the regulator and creates a quantitative risk prevention strategy for the power spot market in China. Finally, an evolutionary dynamic analysis is conducted on players’ strategic evolution space and changes in market risks. Based on a simulation of actual data from an electricity market in China, it turns out that the generation-side market power risk prevention mechanism can lower market transaction and operational risks in a variety of power supply–demand scenarios. The study theoretically supports the development of market power risk prevention and provides more realistic insights into China’s power spot market as well. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T10:32:40Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7b7b979c946142ceac3cb7b73db92e2f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2296-598X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T10:32:40Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Energy Research |
| spelling | doaj.art-7b7b979c946142ceac3cb7b73db92e2f2023-11-14T13:35:41ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Energy Research2296-598X2023-11-011110.3389/fenrg.2023.12706811270681Market power risk prevention mechanism of China’s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamicsJingdong Xie0Bowen Guan1Yin Yao2Ruizhen Li3Quan Shi4College of Electrical Engineering, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai, ChinaCollege of Electrical Engineering, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai, ChinaCollege of Electrical Engineering, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai, ChinaCollege of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai, ChinaCollege of Electrical Engineering, Shanghai University of Electric Power, Shanghai, ChinaThe construction of China’s power spot market is still in its early stage, with a high concentration on generation-side resources and frequent market power. It is urgent to establish risk prevention mechanisms for the generation of market power. First, the paper establishes a basic framework of the stochastic evolutionary game theory and then builds a “stochastic evolutionary game market-clearing” model for the market regulator and risk units. Second, the work provides a library of multi-dimensional monitoring and evaluation indicators for the regulator and creates a quantitative risk prevention strategy for the power spot market in China. Finally, an evolutionary dynamic analysis is conducted on players’ strategic evolution space and changes in market risks. Based on a simulation of actual data from an electricity market in China, it turns out that the generation-side market power risk prevention mechanism can lower market transaction and operational risks in a variety of power supply–demand scenarios. The study theoretically supports the development of market power risk prevention and provides more realistic insights into China’s power spot market as well.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2023.1270681/fullstochastic evolutionary gamepower spot marketmarket power riskadaptive prevention strategyoptimal market clearing |
| spellingShingle | Jingdong Xie Bowen Guan Yin Yao Ruizhen Li Quan Shi Market power risk prevention mechanism of China’s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics Frontiers in Energy Research stochastic evolutionary game power spot market market power risk adaptive prevention strategy optimal market clearing |
| title | Market power risk prevention mechanism of China’s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics |
| title_full | Market power risk prevention mechanism of China’s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics |
| title_fullStr | Market power risk prevention mechanism of China’s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics |
| title_full_unstemmed | Market power risk prevention mechanism of China’s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics |
| title_short | Market power risk prevention mechanism of China’s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics |
| title_sort | market power risk prevention mechanism of china s electricity spot market based on stochastic evolutionary game dynamics |
| topic | stochastic evolutionary game power spot market market power risk adaptive prevention strategy optimal market clearing |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenrg.2023.1270681/full |
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