An efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent-reset attacks
In this paper, first we discuss the security model for deterministic challenge-response identification protocols. For such protocols, we are able to simplify the CR2 security model in [Bellare, Fischlin, Goldwasser, and Micali, Identification protocols secure against reset attacks: 495–511, Springer...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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De Gruyter
2009-12-01
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Series: | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
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Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/JMC.2009.021 |
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author | Wu J. Stinson D. R. |
author_facet | Wu J. Stinson D. R. |
author_sort | Wu J. |
collection | DOAJ |
description | In this paper, first we discuss the security model for deterministic challenge-response identification protocols. For such protocols, we are able to simplify the CR2 security model in [Bellare, Fischlin, Goldwasser, and Micali, Identification protocols secure against reset attacks: 495–511, Springer, 2001] which captures concurrent attacks and reset attacks. Then we propose an extremely simple identification protocol and prove that its CR2 security is equivalent to the hardness of the Strong Diffie–Hellman problem. |
first_indexed | 2024-04-11T11:12:59Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-7d16988b40e84d87864293fa13ddd176 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1862-2976 1862-2984 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-11T11:12:59Z |
publishDate | 2009-12-01 |
publisher | De Gruyter |
record_format | Article |
series | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
spelling | doaj.art-7d16988b40e84d87864293fa13ddd1762022-12-22T04:27:23ZengDe GruyterJournal of Mathematical Cryptology1862-29761862-29842009-12-013433935210.1515/JMC.2009.021An efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent-reset attacksWu J.0Stinson D. R.1Institute of Electronics, Communications and Information Technology, Queen's University Belfast, Belfast, UK. Email: j.wu@ecit.qub.ac.ukDavid R. Cheriton School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1, Canada. Email: dstinson@uwaterloo.caIn this paper, first we discuss the security model for deterministic challenge-response identification protocols. For such protocols, we are able to simplify the CR2 security model in [Bellare, Fischlin, Goldwasser, and Micali, Identification protocols secure against reset attacks: 495–511, Springer, 2001] which captures concurrent attacks and reset attacks. Then we propose an extremely simple identification protocol and prove that its CR2 security is equivalent to the hardness of the Strong Diffie–Hellman problem.https://doi.org/10.1515/JMC.2009.021identificationentity authenticationzero-knowledge |
spellingShingle | Wu J. Stinson D. R. An efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent-reset attacks Journal of Mathematical Cryptology identification entity authentication zero-knowledge |
title | An efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent-reset attacks |
title_full | An efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent-reset attacks |
title_fullStr | An efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent-reset attacks |
title_full_unstemmed | An efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent-reset attacks |
title_short | An efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent-reset attacks |
title_sort | efficient identification protocol secure against concurrent reset attacks |
topic | identification entity authentication zero-knowledge |
url | https://doi.org/10.1515/JMC.2009.021 |
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