Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?

Krupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and non-incentivized versions of the Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of so...

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Main Author: Štěpán Veselý
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2015-03-01
Series:Judgment and Decision Making
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500003958/type/journal_article
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author Štěpán Veselý
author_facet Štěpán Veselý
author_sort Štěpán Veselý
collection DOAJ
description Krupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and non-incentivized versions of the Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.
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spelling doaj.art-7e47b04f976a43748a68bea2b0b66d502023-09-03T10:05:03ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752015-03-011019119710.1017/S1930297500003958Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?Štěpán Veselý0Department of Psychology, Faculty of Arts, Masaryk University, Arne Novaka 1, Brno, 602 00, Czech Republic Department of Public Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk UniversityKrupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and non-incentivized versions of the Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500003958/type/journal_articleappropriatenessfairnesssocial normsincentivesratingultimatum game
spellingShingle Štěpán Veselý
Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
Judgment and Decision Making
appropriateness
fairness
social norms
incentives
rating
ultimatum game
title Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
title_full Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
title_fullStr Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
title_full_unstemmed Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
title_short Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
title_sort elicitation of normative and fairness judgments do incentives matter
topic appropriateness
fairness
social norms
incentives
rating
ultimatum game
url https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500003958/type/journal_article
work_keys_str_mv AT stepanvesely elicitationofnormativeandfairnessjudgmentsdoincentivesmatter