A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain
The rapid expansion of the biomass power generation industry has resulted in the conversion of substantial agricultural waste (crop straw) into energy feedstock, thereby increasing the income of farmers and promoting the development of rural areas. However, the promising industry faces financial def...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2016-06-01
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| Series: | Energies |
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| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/9/6/455 |
| _version_ | 1828151914031742976 |
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| author | Lingling Wang Tsunemi Watanabe |
| author_facet | Lingling Wang Tsunemi Watanabe |
| author_sort | Lingling Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The rapid expansion of the biomass power generation industry has resulted in the conversion of substantial agricultural waste (crop straw) into energy feedstock, thereby increasing the income of farmers and promoting the development of rural areas. However, the promising industry faces financial deficits because of difficulties in collecting straw from farmers. To determine strategies for overcoming the biomass supply problem, we apply Stackelberg game theory in modeling the Chinese biomass supply chain and design incentive scenarios under stakeholder risk perception. We illustrate the proposed methodology through an empirical case study on China and demonstrate the effects of incentives on farmers and middlemen. Results show that with incentives, straw quantity and stakeholder profit are expected to increase. Incentives exert a particularly remarkable effect on farmers, with such inducements producing the highest social welfare. Moreover, perceived risk dramatically affects stakeholder profit. Mitigating the risk perception of farmers is expected to significantly advance the development of the biomass power generation industry, increase stakeholder profit, and decrease the amount of incentives needed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T22:04:15Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7e7fbd6d25514f1ebf4d1ab4810468c2 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1996-1073 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T22:04:15Z |
| publishDate | 2016-06-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Energies |
| spelling | doaj.art-7e7fbd6d25514f1ebf4d1ab4810468c22022-12-22T04:00:46ZengMDPI AGEnergies1996-10732016-06-019645510.3390/en9060455en9060455A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply ChainLingling Wang0Tsunemi Watanabe1School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology, 2-22 Eikokuji-cho, Kochi City, Kochi 780-8515, JapanSchool of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology, 2-22 Eikokuji-cho, Kochi City, Kochi 780-8515, JapanThe rapid expansion of the biomass power generation industry has resulted in the conversion of substantial agricultural waste (crop straw) into energy feedstock, thereby increasing the income of farmers and promoting the development of rural areas. However, the promising industry faces financial deficits because of difficulties in collecting straw from farmers. To determine strategies for overcoming the biomass supply problem, we apply Stackelberg game theory in modeling the Chinese biomass supply chain and design incentive scenarios under stakeholder risk perception. We illustrate the proposed methodology through an empirical case study on China and demonstrate the effects of incentives on farmers and middlemen. Results show that with incentives, straw quantity and stakeholder profit are expected to increase. Incentives exert a particularly remarkable effect on farmers, with such inducements producing the highest social welfare. Moreover, perceived risk dramatically affects stakeholder profit. Mitigating the risk perception of farmers is expected to significantly advance the development of the biomass power generation industry, increase stakeholder profit, and decrease the amount of incentives needed.http://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/9/6/455supply chainbiomass power plantstackelberg game theoryperceived risk |
| spellingShingle | Lingling Wang Tsunemi Watanabe A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain Energies supply chain biomass power plant stackelberg game theory perceived risk |
| title | A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain |
| title_full | A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain |
| title_fullStr | A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain |
| title_short | A Stackelberg Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentive Effects under Perceived Risk for China’s Straw-Based Power Plant Supply Chain |
| title_sort | stackelberg game theoretic analysis of incentive effects under perceived risk for china s straw based power plant supply chain |
| topic | supply chain biomass power plant stackelberg game theory perceived risk |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/9/6/455 |
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