Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process?
Traditionally, paradigms used to study conflict in reasoning (and metacognition during reasoning) pit heuristic processes against analytical processes. Findings indicate that the presence of conflict between processes prolongs reasoning and decreases accuracy and confidence. In this study, we aimed...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2023-02-01
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| Series: | Journal of Intelligence |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-3200/11/2/33 |
| _version_ | 1797620133404868608 |
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| author | Pavle Valerjev Marin Dujmović |
| author_facet | Pavle Valerjev Marin Dujmović |
| author_sort | Pavle Valerjev |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Traditionally, paradigms used to study conflict in reasoning (and metacognition during reasoning) pit heuristic processes against analytical processes. Findings indicate that the presence of conflict between processes prolongs reasoning and decreases accuracy and confidence. In this study, we aimed to explore reasoning and metacognition when only one type of heuristic process is exploited to cue multiple responses. In two experiments, a novel modification of the Base Rate neglect task was used to create versions in which one belief-based heuristic competes, or works in concert, with another of the same type to provide a response. Experiment 1 results reveal that the presence of conflict between cued responses does not affect meta-reasoning, which indicates that reasoning defaulted to a single process. An alternative explanation was that the effect of conflict was masked due to an imbalance in the strength of the dominant response between conflicting and congruent versions. Experiment 2 was designed to test hypotheses based on these competing explanations. Findings show that when the strength of a response was no longer masking the effect, the conflict did result in longer reasoning times and lower confidence. The study provides more robust evidence in favor of the dual-process account of reasoning, introduces a new methodological approach, and discusses how conflict may be modulated during reasoning. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-11T08:36:36Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7ee892f14dce4b5c9316c25eccf39693 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2079-3200 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-11T08:36:36Z |
| publishDate | 2023-02-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Intelligence |
| spelling | doaj.art-7ee892f14dce4b5c9316c25eccf396932023-11-16T21:25:34ZengMDPI AGJournal of Intelligence2079-32002023-02-011123310.3390/jintelligence11020033Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process?Pavle Valerjev0Marin Dujmović1Department of Psychology, University of Zadar, 23000 Zadar, CroatiaSchool of Psychological Science, University of Bristol, Bristol BS8 1QU, UKTraditionally, paradigms used to study conflict in reasoning (and metacognition during reasoning) pit heuristic processes against analytical processes. Findings indicate that the presence of conflict between processes prolongs reasoning and decreases accuracy and confidence. In this study, we aimed to explore reasoning and metacognition when only one type of heuristic process is exploited to cue multiple responses. In two experiments, a novel modification of the Base Rate neglect task was used to create versions in which one belief-based heuristic competes, or works in concert, with another of the same type to provide a response. Experiment 1 results reveal that the presence of conflict between cued responses does not affect meta-reasoning, which indicates that reasoning defaulted to a single process. An alternative explanation was that the effect of conflict was masked due to an imbalance in the strength of the dominant response between conflicting and congruent versions. Experiment 2 was designed to test hypotheses based on these competing explanations. Findings show that when the strength of a response was no longer masking the effect, the conflict did result in longer reasoning times and lower confidence. The study provides more robust evidence in favor of the dual-process account of reasoning, introduces a new methodological approach, and discusses how conflict may be modulated during reasoning.https://www.mdpi.com/2079-3200/11/2/33dual-process theoryreasoningmeta-reasoningheuristicsintuitive reasoningsingle-process reasoning |
| spellingShingle | Pavle Valerjev Marin Dujmović Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process? Journal of Intelligence dual-process theory reasoning meta-reasoning heuristics intuitive reasoning single-process reasoning |
| title | Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process? |
| title_full | Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process? |
| title_fullStr | Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process? |
| title_short | Single-Heuristic Reasoning: Is It Still Dual-Process? |
| title_sort | single heuristic reasoning is it still dual process |
| topic | dual-process theory reasoning meta-reasoning heuristics intuitive reasoning single-process reasoning |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2079-3200/11/2/33 |
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