Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games
Social-ecological systems are governed by a complex of ecology of games featuring multiple actors, policy institutions, and issues, and not just single institutions operating in isolation. We update Long's (1958) ecology of games to analyze the coordinating roles of actors and institutions in t...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Resilience Alliance
2014-12-01
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| Series: | Ecology and Society |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss4/art23/ |
| _version_ | 1818403074273705984 |
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| author | Mark Lubell Garry Robins Peng Wang |
| author_facet | Mark Lubell Garry Robins Peng Wang |
| author_sort | Mark Lubell |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Social-ecological systems are governed by a complex of ecology of games featuring multiple actors, policy institutions, and issues, and not just single institutions operating in isolation. We update Long's (1958) ecology of games to analyze the coordinating roles of actors and institutions in the context of the ecology of water management games in San Francisco Bay, California. The ecology of games is operationalized as a bipartite network with actors participating in institutions, and exponential random graph models are used to test hypotheses about the structural features of the network. We found that policy coordination is facilitated mostly by federal and state agencies and collaborative institutions that span geographic boundaries. Network configurations associated with closure show the most significant departures from the predicted model values, consistent with the Berardo and Scholz (2010) "risk hypothesis" that closure is important for solving cooperation problems. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-14T08:18:28Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7f31e1cc6e35439ebedb3244261eb316 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1708-3087 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-14T08:18:28Z |
| publishDate | 2014-12-01 |
| publisher | Resilience Alliance |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ecology and Society |
| spelling | doaj.art-7f31e1cc6e35439ebedb3244261eb3162022-12-21T23:09:51ZengResilience AllianceEcology and Society1708-30872014-12-011942310.5751/ES-06880-1904236880Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management gamesMark Lubell0Garry Robins1Peng Wang2Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California Davis, Center for Environmental Policy and BehaviorUniversity of MelbourneUniversity of MelbourneSocial-ecological systems are governed by a complex of ecology of games featuring multiple actors, policy institutions, and issues, and not just single institutions operating in isolation. We update Long's (1958) ecology of games to analyze the coordinating roles of actors and institutions in the context of the ecology of water management games in San Francisco Bay, California. The ecology of games is operationalized as a bipartite network with actors participating in institutions, and exponential random graph models are used to test hypotheses about the structural features of the network. We found that policy coordination is facilitated mostly by federal and state agencies and collaborative institutions that span geographic boundaries. Network configurations associated with closure show the most significant departures from the predicted model values, consistent with the Berardo and Scholz (2010) "risk hypothesis" that closure is important for solving cooperation problems.http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss4/art23/complex adaptive systemscooperationecology of gamesinstitutionsresilience |
| spellingShingle | Mark Lubell Garry Robins Peng Wang Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games Ecology and Society complex adaptive systems cooperation ecology of games institutions resilience |
| title | Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games |
| title_full | Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games |
| title_fullStr | Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games |
| title_short | Network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games |
| title_sort | network structure and institutional complexity in an ecology of water management games |
| topic | complex adaptive systems cooperation ecology of games institutions resilience |
| url | http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss4/art23/ |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT marklubell networkstructureandinstitutionalcomplexityinanecologyofwatermanagementgames AT garryrobins networkstructureandinstitutionalcomplexityinanecologyofwatermanagementgames AT pengwang networkstructureandinstitutionalcomplexityinanecologyofwatermanagementgames |