On the Naturalistic Fallacy: A Conceptual Basis for Evolutionary Ethics
In debates concerning evolutionary approaches to ethics the Naturalistic Fallacy (i.e., deriving values from facts or “ought” from “is”) is often invoked as a constraining principle. For example, Stephen Jay Gould asserts the most that evolutionary studies can hope to do is set out the conditions un...
Main Authors: | John Teehan, Christopher diCarlo |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
SAGE Publishing
2004-01-01
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Series: | Evolutionary Psychology |
Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/147470490400200108 |
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