Green Supply Chain Coordination During the COVID-19 Pandemic Based on Consignment Contract
COVID-19 has further strengthened consumers’ online consumption habits and brought a new boom in which enterprises can use online transactions and green products to avoid risk and gain profits in the pandemic. A green supply chain model is established containing one e-commerce platform and one manuf...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Frontiers Media S.A.
2022-06-01
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| Series: | Frontiers in Environmental Science |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.899007/full |
| _version_ | 1828833633382694912 |
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| author | Yi Wang Geovanny Genaro Reivan Ortiz William Dextre-Martinez Liandi Zhang |
| author_facet | Yi Wang Geovanny Genaro Reivan Ortiz William Dextre-Martinez Liandi Zhang |
| author_sort | Yi Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | COVID-19 has further strengthened consumers’ online consumption habits and brought a new boom in which enterprises can use online transactions and green products to avoid risk and gain profits in the pandemic. A green supply chain model is established containing one e-commerce platform and one manufacturer. The Nash bargaining contract and Rubinstein bargaining contract are applied to mitigate conflicts of profits in the model. From the coordination analysis, we show that both Nash and Rubinstein bargaining contracts can achieve coordination and mitigate conflict of profits through the adjustment of platform usage rates. According to each member’s bargaining power and patience, the optimal platform usage rate is determined, the supply chain profits of both sides are allocated, the green production’s research and development are promoted, and a win-win situation is realized. Specifically, in the Nash bargaining contract, the excess profit of each member depends on their bargaining power. The stronger the bargaining power, the more excess profits will go to the e-commerce platform, and the less excess profits will go to the manufacturer. In the Rubinstein bargaining contract, the excess profit of each member depends on the lowest profit bound and bargaining patience. The higher the manufacturer’s (or e-commerce platform’s) patience, the higher his profit. When the patience of both is high (or low), the e-commerce platform (or the manufacturer) plays a leading role and obtains more profits. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-12T17:23:36Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-7fd907e833d84aa68843fd1301c79ae7 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2296-665X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-12T17:23:36Z |
| publishDate | 2022-06-01 |
| publisher | Frontiers Media S.A. |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Frontiers in Environmental Science |
| spelling | doaj.art-7fd907e833d84aa68843fd1301c79ae72022-12-22T00:17:35ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Environmental Science2296-665X2022-06-011010.3389/fenvs.2022.899007899007Green Supply Chain Coordination During the COVID-19 Pandemic Based on Consignment ContractYi Wang0Geovanny Genaro Reivan Ortiz1William Dextre-Martinez2Liandi Zhang3College of Science, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin, ChinaLaboratory of Basic Psychology, Behavioral Analysis and Programmatic Development PAD-LAB, Catholic University of Cuenca, Cuenca, EcuadorSchool of Management and Tourism, Universidad Nacional Santiago Antúnez de Mayolo, Huaraz, PeruCollege of Science, Tianjin University of Commerce, Tianjin, ChinaCOVID-19 has further strengthened consumers’ online consumption habits and brought a new boom in which enterprises can use online transactions and green products to avoid risk and gain profits in the pandemic. A green supply chain model is established containing one e-commerce platform and one manufacturer. The Nash bargaining contract and Rubinstein bargaining contract are applied to mitigate conflicts of profits in the model. From the coordination analysis, we show that both Nash and Rubinstein bargaining contracts can achieve coordination and mitigate conflict of profits through the adjustment of platform usage rates. According to each member’s bargaining power and patience, the optimal platform usage rate is determined, the supply chain profits of both sides are allocated, the green production’s research and development are promoted, and a win-win situation is realized. Specifically, in the Nash bargaining contract, the excess profit of each member depends on their bargaining power. The stronger the bargaining power, the more excess profits will go to the e-commerce platform, and the less excess profits will go to the manufacturer. In the Rubinstein bargaining contract, the excess profit of each member depends on the lowest profit bound and bargaining patience. The higher the manufacturer’s (or e-commerce platform’s) patience, the higher his profit. When the patience of both is high (or low), the e-commerce platform (or the manufacturer) plays a leading role and obtains more profits.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.899007/fullCOVID-19green supply chainconsignment contractsustainable developmentenvironmental sustainability |
| spellingShingle | Yi Wang Geovanny Genaro Reivan Ortiz William Dextre-Martinez Liandi Zhang Green Supply Chain Coordination During the COVID-19 Pandemic Based on Consignment Contract Frontiers in Environmental Science COVID-19 green supply chain consignment contract sustainable development environmental sustainability |
| title | Green Supply Chain Coordination During the COVID-19 Pandemic Based on Consignment Contract |
| title_full | Green Supply Chain Coordination During the COVID-19 Pandemic Based on Consignment Contract |
| title_fullStr | Green Supply Chain Coordination During the COVID-19 Pandemic Based on Consignment Contract |
| title_full_unstemmed | Green Supply Chain Coordination During the COVID-19 Pandemic Based on Consignment Contract |
| title_short | Green Supply Chain Coordination During the COVID-19 Pandemic Based on Consignment Contract |
| title_sort | green supply chain coordination during the covid 19 pandemic based on consignment contract |
| topic | COVID-19 green supply chain consignment contract sustainable development environmental sustainability |
| url | https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.899007/full |
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