Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics
Classical economists from Adam Smith to Thomas Malthus and to Karl Marx have considered the importance of direct interdependence and direct interactions for the economy. This was even more the case for original institutionalist thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Clarence Ayres. In...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2014-09-01
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| Series: | Games |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/3/188 |
| _version_ | 1819140359285899264 |
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| author | Wolfram Elsner Torsten Heinrich Henning Schwardt Claudius Gräbner |
| author_facet | Wolfram Elsner Torsten Heinrich Henning Schwardt Claudius Gräbner |
| author_sort | Wolfram Elsner |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Classical economists from Adam Smith to Thomas Malthus and to Karl Marx have considered the importance of direct interdependence and direct interactions for the economy. This was even more the case for original institutionalist thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Clarence Ayres. In their writings, direct interdependence, interactions (or transactions) among agents, with all beneficial and with all problematic consequences, took center stage in economic analysis. Why, for instance, do people adhere to a particular new fashion or trend? Because others do, after eminent people, wealthy people, the “leisure class” (T. Veblen), have made it a symbol for status. The new fashion, however, ceases to serve as such a symbol once too many people follow it. The constant effort put into following trends and adopting fashion turns out to be a social dilemma, driven by Veblenian instincts, such as invidious distinction in predatory societies, conspicuous consumption and emulation. [...] |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-22T11:37:18Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-8042bfaec2e14d418c471e15eabe4b84 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-22T11:37:18Z |
| publishDate | 2014-09-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-8042bfaec2e14d418c471e15eabe4b842022-12-21T18:27:24ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362014-09-015318819010.3390/g5030188g5030188Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional EconomicsWolfram Elsner0Torsten Heinrich1Henning Schwardt2Claudius Gräbner3Structural Research and Policy Division, (iino) Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, GermanyStructural Research and Policy Division, (iino) Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, GermanyStructural Research and Policy Division, (iino) Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, GermanyStructural Research and Policy Division, (iino) Institute for Institutional and Innovation Economics, Department of Business Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Hochschulring 4, D-28359 Bremen, GermanyClassical economists from Adam Smith to Thomas Malthus and to Karl Marx have considered the importance of direct interdependence and direct interactions for the economy. This was even more the case for original institutionalist thinkers such as Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and Clarence Ayres. In their writings, direct interdependence, interactions (or transactions) among agents, with all beneficial and with all problematic consequences, took center stage in economic analysis. Why, for instance, do people adhere to a particular new fashion or trend? Because others do, after eminent people, wealthy people, the “leisure class” (T. Veblen), have made it a symbol for status. The new fashion, however, ceases to serve as such a symbol once too many people follow it. The constant effort put into following trends and adopting fashion turns out to be a social dilemma, driven by Veblenian instincts, such as invidious distinction in predatory societies, conspicuous consumption and emulation. [...]http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/3/188n/a |
| spellingShingle | Wolfram Elsner Torsten Heinrich Henning Schwardt Claudius Gräbner Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics Games n/a |
| title | Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics |
| title_full | Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics |
| title_fullStr | Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics |
| title_full_unstemmed | Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics |
| title_short | Special Issue: Aspects of Game Theory and Institutional Economics |
| title_sort | special issue aspects of game theory and institutional economics |
| topic | n/a |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/5/3/188 |
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