Incentive-Compatible Packet Forwarding in Mobile Social Networks via Evolutionary Game Theory
In the absence of end-to-end paths and without the knowledge of the whole network, packet forwarding, including forwarding decision (i.e., forwarding or dropping the packet) and relaying selection, is crucial to be made by the individual of the node based on the packet-forwarding protocol in autonom...
Main Authors: | Li Feng, Qinghai Yang, Kyung Sup Kwak |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
IEEE
2017-01-01
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Series: | IEEE Access |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7891995/ |
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