Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective

It is commonly thought that the prevalence of moral dissent poses a problem for the moral cognitivist, forcing her to diagnose either a lot of misunderstanding, or a lot of unexplained observational error. Since mere misunderstanding can be ruled out in most cases of moral dissent, and since the dia...

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Main Author: Matthias Kiesselbach
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina 2009-07-01
Series:Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/19260
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description It is commonly thought that the prevalence of moral dissent poses a problem for the moral cognitivist, forcing her to diagnose either a lot of misunderstanding, or a lot of unexplained observational error. Since mere misunderstanding can be ruled out in most cases of moral dissent, and since the diagnosis of widespread unexplained error is interpretively unstable, prevalent dissent has pushed many philosophers towards non-cognitivism. In this essay, I argue that once a diachronic, pragmatist theory of language along the lines of the latest Wittgenstein is employed, a third interpretive option becomes available to the cognitivist. Besides the diagnostic options of misunderstanding and factual disagreement, she can argue that a given case of moral dissent is an instance of grammatical tension. This interpretation not only saves moral cognitivism, it also has some attractive theoretical implications. Among other things, it yields an elegant way of solving the current debate around moral particularism.
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spelling doaj.art-8097e2dbb9ab40dcbae74ec50d5abe492022-12-21T22:47:34ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaEthic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy1677-29542009-07-018112514510.5007/1677-2954.2009v8n1p12515461Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspectiveMatthias KiesselbachIt is commonly thought that the prevalence of moral dissent poses a problem for the moral cognitivist, forcing her to diagnose either a lot of misunderstanding, or a lot of unexplained observational error. Since mere misunderstanding can be ruled out in most cases of moral dissent, and since the diagnosis of widespread unexplained error is interpretively unstable, prevalent dissent has pushed many philosophers towards non-cognitivism. In this essay, I argue that once a diachronic, pragmatist theory of language along the lines of the latest Wittgenstein is employed, a third interpretive option becomes available to the cognitivist. Besides the diagnostic options of misunderstanding and factual disagreement, she can argue that a given case of moral dissent is an instance of grammatical tension. This interpretation not only saves moral cognitivism, it also has some attractive theoretical implications. Among other things, it yields an elegant way of solving the current debate around moral particularism.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/19260moral cognitivismmoral dissentinferentialismlinguistic evolutionmoral objectivismwittgenstein
spellingShingle Matthias Kiesselbach
Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective
Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy
moral cognitivism
moral dissent
inferentialism
linguistic evolution
moral objectivism
wittgenstein
title Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective
title_full Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective
title_fullStr Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective
title_full_unstemmed Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective
title_short Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective
title_sort warring tautologies moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective
topic moral cognitivism
moral dissent
inferentialism
linguistic evolution
moral objectivism
wittgenstein
url https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/19260
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