Warring tautologies: moral dissent from a cognitivist perspective
It is commonly thought that the prevalence of moral dissent poses a problem for the moral cognitivist, forcing her to diagnose either a lot of misunderstanding, or a lot of unexplained observational error. Since mere misunderstanding can be ruled out in most cases of moral dissent, and since the dia...
Main Author: | Matthias Kiesselbach |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2009-07-01
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Series: | Ethic@: an International Journal for Moral Philosophy |
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/ethic/article/view/19260 |
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