Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy
Intermodal road-rail transportation (IRRT) integrates the advantages of railways and roads to achieve a win-win situation for all participants. However, the interest game problem of IRRT affects the enthusiasm of each sub-carrier to cooperate, which makes it difficult to show its advantages in the c...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Slavonski Brod, Faculty of Electrical Engineering in Osijek, Faculty of Civil Engineering in Osijek
2022-01-01
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| Series: | Tehnički Vjesnik |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/412471 |
| _version_ | 1797206660686544896 |
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| author | Yu Shi Hui Wang Shuai Di Long Chen |
| author_facet | Yu Shi Hui Wang Shuai Di Long Chen |
| author_sort | Yu Shi |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Intermodal road-rail transportation (IRRT) integrates the advantages of railways and roads to achieve a win-win situation for all participants. However, the interest game problem of IRRT affects the enthusiasm of each sub-carrier to cooperate, which makes it difficult to show its advantages in the competition with the truck-only transport (TOT), and then retards the promotion process of the multimodal transport industry. In order to improve the competitiveness of IRRT, based on Stackelberg game and low-carbon policy, the interest coordination problem of supply chain composed of road transport enterprises (RTE), railway transport enterprises (RWTE) and multimodal transport operators (MTO) is studied under the background of the TOT's competition. The RESULTS SHOW THAT THE active intervention of the local government has a significant promotion effect on the profits of the RTE and the RWTE under the decentralized decision mode, while the profits of the MTO show a trend of decreasing first and then increasing. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-24T09:10:33Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-81178bff15384de0877235b1a1c7d700 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1330-3651 1848-6339 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-24T09:10:33Z |
| publishDate | 2022-01-01 |
| publisher | Faculty of Mechanical Engineering in Slavonski Brod, Faculty of Electrical Engineering in Osijek, Faculty of Civil Engineering in Osijek |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Tehnički Vjesnik |
| spelling | doaj.art-81178bff15384de0877235b1a1c7d7002024-04-15T18:01:21ZengFaculty of Mechanical Engineering in Slavonski Brod, Faculty of Electrical Engineering in Osijek, Faculty of Civil Engineering in OsijekTehnički Vjesnik1330-36511848-63392022-01-012962038204710.17559/TV-20220817070447Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon PolicyYu Shi0Hui Wang1Shuai Di2Long Chen3School of Management, Shijiazhuang Tiedao University, Shijiazhuang 050043, Hebei Province, ChinaSchool of Management, Shijiazhuang Tiedao University, Shijiazhuang 050043, Hebei Province, ChinaHebei Logistics Jianlong Co., Ltd, Shijiazhuang 050000, Hebei Province, ChinaState Key Laboratory of Mechanical Behavior and System Safety of Traffic Engineering Structure, Shijiazhuang Tiedao University, Shijiazhuang 050043, Hebei Province, ChinaIntermodal road-rail transportation (IRRT) integrates the advantages of railways and roads to achieve a win-win situation for all participants. However, the interest game problem of IRRT affects the enthusiasm of each sub-carrier to cooperate, which makes it difficult to show its advantages in the competition with the truck-only transport (TOT), and then retards the promotion process of the multimodal transport industry. In order to improve the competitiveness of IRRT, based on Stackelberg game and low-carbon policy, the interest coordination problem of supply chain composed of road transport enterprises (RTE), railway transport enterprises (RWTE) and multimodal transport operators (MTO) is studied under the background of the TOT's competition. The RESULTS SHOW THAT THE active intervention of the local government has a significant promotion effect on the profits of the RTE and the RWTE under the decentralized decision mode, while the profits of the MTO show a trend of decreasing first and then increasing.https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/412471carbon emissionsgame theorygovernment interventioninterest gameIRRT supply chain |
| spellingShingle | Yu Shi Hui Wang Shuai Di Long Chen Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy Tehnički Vjesnik carbon emissions game theory government intervention interest game IRRT supply chain |
| title | Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy |
| title_full | Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy |
| title_fullStr | Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy |
| title_full_unstemmed | Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy |
| title_short | Study on the Interest Game of Intermodal Road-Rail Transportation Under Low Carbon Policy |
| title_sort | study on the interest game of intermodal road rail transportation under low carbon policy |
| topic | carbon emissions game theory government intervention interest game IRRT supply chain |
| url | https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/412471 |
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