Debunking Doxastic Transparency

In this paper I consider the project of offering an evolutionary debunking explanation for transparency in doxastic deliberation. I examine Nicole Dular and Nikki Fortier’s (2021) attempt at such a project. I suggest that their account faces a dilemma. On the one horn, their explanation of transpare...

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Main Author: Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 2022-01-01
Series:European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/395324
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author Ema Sullivan-Bissett
author_facet Ema Sullivan-Bissett
author_sort Ema Sullivan-Bissett
collection DOAJ
description In this paper I consider the project of offering an evolutionary debunking explanation for transparency in doxastic deliberation. I examine Nicole Dular and Nikki Fortier’s (2021) attempt at such a project. I suggest that their account faces a dilemma. On the one horn, their explanation of transparency involves casting our mechanisms for belief formation as solely concerned with truth. I argue that this is explanatorily inadequate when we take a wider view of our belief formation practices. I show that Dular and Fortier overstate the extent to which adaptive non-evidentially supported beliefs are rare, and the implausibility of disjunctive evolutionary systems. They should allow a role for the non-truth directed behaviour of our mechanisms of belief formation. On the other hand, we might restrict the explanation offered by Dular and Fortier to the deliberative context, that is, we might understand them as allowing for non-evidential belief formation outside of the deliberative context, but as identifying the key to explaining transparency in the truth-directed evolutionary mechanisms as they operate in the deliberative context. However, this would land them on the second horn of the dilemma: we would then have no different an explanation to one I have offered elsewhere (2018), an explanation which Dular and Fortier explicitly put aside as engaged in a project different from their own. I finish by briefly considering some broader implications relating to explaining transparency, the nature of belief, and the prospects for pragmatism. I conclude that Dular and Fortier’s debunking explanation of transparency bestows an implausible role for truth in fixing our beliefs, or, if it doesn’t, then we simply have the restatement of a view explicitly disavowed by the authors. We are left, then, with an explanation we ought not want, or an explanation we already had.
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spelling doaj.art-82670d879f444a058a763b3175eb980d2024-04-15T17:35:55ZengUniversity of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social SciencesEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy1845-84751849-05142022-01-01181A32410.31820/ejap.18.1.3Debunking Doxastic TransparencyEma Sullivan-Bissett0University of BirminghamIn this paper I consider the project of offering an evolutionary debunking explanation for transparency in doxastic deliberation. I examine Nicole Dular and Nikki Fortier’s (2021) attempt at such a project. I suggest that their account faces a dilemma. On the one horn, their explanation of transparency involves casting our mechanisms for belief formation as solely concerned with truth. I argue that this is explanatorily inadequate when we take a wider view of our belief formation practices. I show that Dular and Fortier overstate the extent to which adaptive non-evidentially supported beliefs are rare, and the implausibility of disjunctive evolutionary systems. They should allow a role for the non-truth directed behaviour of our mechanisms of belief formation. On the other hand, we might restrict the explanation offered by Dular and Fortier to the deliberative context, that is, we might understand them as allowing for non-evidential belief formation outside of the deliberative context, but as identifying the key to explaining transparency in the truth-directed evolutionary mechanisms as they operate in the deliberative context. However, this would land them on the second horn of the dilemma: we would then have no different an explanation to one I have offered elsewhere (2018), an explanation which Dular and Fortier explicitly put aside as engaged in a project different from their own. I finish by briefly considering some broader implications relating to explaining transparency, the nature of belief, and the prospects for pragmatism. I conclude that Dular and Fortier’s debunking explanation of transparency bestows an implausible role for truth in fixing our beliefs, or, if it doesn’t, then we simply have the restatement of a view explicitly disavowed by the authors. We are left, then, with an explanation we ought not want, or an explanation we already had.https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/395324belieftransparencydoxastic deliberationevolutionary debunkingreasons for belief
spellingShingle Ema Sullivan-Bissett
Debunking Doxastic Transparency
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
belief
transparency
doxastic deliberation
evolutionary debunking
reasons for belief
title Debunking Doxastic Transparency
title_full Debunking Doxastic Transparency
title_fullStr Debunking Doxastic Transparency
title_full_unstemmed Debunking Doxastic Transparency
title_short Debunking Doxastic Transparency
title_sort debunking doxastic transparency
topic belief
transparency
doxastic deliberation
evolutionary debunking
reasons for belief
url https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/395324
work_keys_str_mv AT emasullivanbissett debunkingdoxastictransparency