Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme
Stickel's key agreement scheme was successfully cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GL(n, q) is used as a platform. Shpilrain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n × n matrices defined over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a more gener...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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De Gruyter
2011-04-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc.2011.003 |
| Summary: | Stickel's key agreement scheme was successfully cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GL(n, q) is used as a platform. Shpilrain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n × n matrices defined over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a more general method of generating keys, involving polynomials of matrices over R. When R = 𝔽q, we show that these variants of Stickel's scheme are susceptible to a linear algebra attack. We discuss other natural candidates for R, and conclude that until a suitable ring is proposed, the variant schemes may be considered insecure. |
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| ISSN: | 1862-2976 1862-2984 |