Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme

Stickel's key agreement scheme was successfully cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GL(n, q) is used as a platform. Shpilrain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n × n matrices defined over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a more gener...

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Main Author: Mullan Ciaran
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: De Gruyter 2011-04-01
Series:Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc.2011.003
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author Mullan Ciaran
author_facet Mullan Ciaran
author_sort Mullan Ciaran
collection DOAJ
description Stickel's key agreement scheme was successfully cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GL(n, q) is used as a platform. Shpilrain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n × n matrices defined over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a more general method of generating keys, involving polynomials of matrices over R. When R = 𝔽q, we show that these variants of Stickel's scheme are susceptible to a linear algebra attack. We discuss other natural candidates for R, and conclude that until a suitable ring is proposed, the variant schemes may be considered insecure.
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spelling doaj.art-82ea3fc7d4034b919fe257b5295358be2022-12-22T03:09:44ZengDe GruyterJournal of Mathematical Cryptology1862-29761862-29842011-04-014436537310.1515/jmc.2011.003Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement schemeMullan Ciaran0Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, TW20 0EX., United Kingdom.Stickel's key agreement scheme was successfully cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GL(n, q) is used as a platform. Shpilrain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n × n matrices defined over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a more general method of generating keys, involving polynomials of matrices over R. When R = 𝔽q, we show that these variants of Stickel's scheme are susceptible to a linear algebra attack. We discuss other natural candidates for R, and conclude that until a suitable ring is proposed, the variant schemes may be considered insecure.https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc.2011.003cryptanalysisgroup-based cryptography
spellingShingle Mullan Ciaran
Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme
Journal of Mathematical Cryptology
cryptanalysis
group-based cryptography
title Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme
title_full Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme
title_fullStr Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme
title_full_unstemmed Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme
title_short Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme
title_sort cryptanalysing variants of stickel s key agreement scheme
topic cryptanalysis
group-based cryptography
url https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc.2011.003
work_keys_str_mv AT mullanciaran cryptanalysingvariantsofstickelskeyagreementscheme