Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme
Stickel's key agreement scheme was successfully cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GL(n, q) is used as a platform. Shpilrain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n × n matrices defined over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a more gener...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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De Gruyter
2011-04-01
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Series: | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
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Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc.2011.003 |
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author | Mullan Ciaran |
author_facet | Mullan Ciaran |
author_sort | Mullan Ciaran |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Stickel's key agreement scheme was successfully cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GL(n, q) is used as a platform. Shpilrain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n × n matrices defined over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a more general method of generating keys, involving polynomials of matrices over R. When R = 𝔽q, we show that these variants of Stickel's scheme are susceptible to a linear algebra attack. We discuss other natural candidates for R, and conclude that until a suitable ring is proposed, the variant schemes may be considered insecure. |
first_indexed | 2024-04-13T00:54:26Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-82ea3fc7d4034b919fe257b5295358be |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1862-2976 1862-2984 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-13T00:54:26Z |
publishDate | 2011-04-01 |
publisher | De Gruyter |
record_format | Article |
series | Journal of Mathematical Cryptology |
spelling | doaj.art-82ea3fc7d4034b919fe257b5295358be2022-12-22T03:09:44ZengDe GruyterJournal of Mathematical Cryptology1862-29761862-29842011-04-014436537310.1515/jmc.2011.003Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement schemeMullan Ciaran0Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London, TW20 0EX., United Kingdom.Stickel's key agreement scheme was successfully cryptanalysed by V. Shpilrain when GL(n, q) is used as a platform. Shpilrain suggested the algebra of all (not necessarily invertible) n × n matrices defined over some finite ring R would make a more secure platform. He also suggested a more general method of generating keys, involving polynomials of matrices over R. When R = 𝔽q, we show that these variants of Stickel's scheme are susceptible to a linear algebra attack. We discuss other natural candidates for R, and conclude that until a suitable ring is proposed, the variant schemes may be considered insecure.https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc.2011.003cryptanalysisgroup-based cryptography |
spellingShingle | Mullan Ciaran Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme Journal of Mathematical Cryptology cryptanalysis group-based cryptography |
title | Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme |
title_full | Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme |
title_fullStr | Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme |
title_full_unstemmed | Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme |
title_short | Cryptanalysing variants of Stickel's key agreement scheme |
title_sort | cryptanalysing variants of stickel s key agreement scheme |
topic | cryptanalysis group-based cryptography |
url | https://doi.org/10.1515/jmc.2011.003 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT mullanciaran cryptanalysingvariantsofstickelskeyagreementscheme |