Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures
Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can introduce additional degrees of freedom in the quantum states that may render them distinguishable to an eavesdropper. This is the case of QKD systems using a different laser source to generate each quantum state, which can le...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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IEEE
2022-01-01
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Series: | IEEE Access |
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Online Access: | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9850989/ |
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author | Pablo Arteaga-Diaz Daniel Cano Veronica Fernandez |
author_facet | Pablo Arteaga-Diaz Daniel Cano Veronica Fernandez |
author_sort | Pablo Arteaga-Diaz |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can introduce additional degrees of freedom in the quantum states that may render them distinguishable to an eavesdropper. This is the case of QKD systems using a different laser source to generate each quantum state, which can lead to temporal, spectral and/or spatial differences among them that can be exploited by a malicious party to extract information of the key. In this work we characterize, and experimentally verify, a side-channel attack on spatially distinguishable states against free-space QKD systems with misaligned laser sources. Specifically, for those emitting Gaussian beams, which is the most common case in free-space QKD. The attack makes theoretically unsafe any QKD system with any angular misalignment between the laser sources. Finally, we propose two countermeasures to eliminate the spatial distinguishability and secure the key exchange. |
first_indexed | 2024-04-11T22:42:35Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-83382745cc6240c7bc596f5aae53e8c9 |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2169-3536 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-04-11T22:42:35Z |
publishDate | 2022-01-01 |
publisher | IEEE |
record_format | Article |
series | IEEE Access |
spelling | doaj.art-83382745cc6240c7bc596f5aae53e8c92022-12-22T03:58:56ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362022-01-0110826978270510.1109/ACCESS.2022.31966779850989Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and CountermeasuresPablo Arteaga-Diaz0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8281-8353Daniel Cano1Veronica Fernandez2Spanish National Research Council(CSIC), Institute of Physical and Information Technologies, Madrid, SpainSpanish National Research Council(CSIC), Institute of Physical and Information Technologies, Madrid, SpainSpanish National Research Council(CSIC), Institute of Physical and Information Technologies, Madrid, SpainPractical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can introduce additional degrees of freedom in the quantum states that may render them distinguishable to an eavesdropper. This is the case of QKD systems using a different laser source to generate each quantum state, which can lead to temporal, spectral and/or spatial differences among them that can be exploited by a malicious party to extract information of the key. In this work we characterize, and experimentally verify, a side-channel attack on spatially distinguishable states against free-space QKD systems with misaligned laser sources. Specifically, for those emitting Gaussian beams, which is the most common case in free-space QKD. The attack makes theoretically unsafe any QKD system with any angular misalignment between the laser sources. Finally, we propose two countermeasures to eliminate the spatial distinguishability and secure the key exchange.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9850989/Countermeasuresfree-space QKDquantum key distributionside-channel attackspatial distinguishability |
spellingShingle | Pablo Arteaga-Diaz Daniel Cano Veronica Fernandez Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures IEEE Access Countermeasures free-space QKD quantum key distribution side-channel attack spatial distinguishability |
title | Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures |
title_full | Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures |
title_fullStr | Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures |
title_full_unstemmed | Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures |
title_short | Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures |
title_sort | practical side channel attack on free space qkd systems with misaligned sources and countermeasures |
topic | Countermeasures free-space QKD quantum key distribution side-channel attack spatial distinguishability |
url | https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9850989/ |
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