Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures

Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can introduce additional degrees of freedom in the quantum states that may render them distinguishable to an eavesdropper. This is the case of QKD systems using a different laser source to generate each quantum state, which can le...

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Main Authors: Pablo Arteaga-Diaz, Daniel Cano, Veronica Fernandez
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2022-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9850989/
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author Pablo Arteaga-Diaz
Daniel Cano
Veronica Fernandez
author_facet Pablo Arteaga-Diaz
Daniel Cano
Veronica Fernandez
author_sort Pablo Arteaga-Diaz
collection DOAJ
description Practical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can introduce additional degrees of freedom in the quantum states that may render them distinguishable to an eavesdropper. This is the case of QKD systems using a different laser source to generate each quantum state, which can lead to temporal, spectral and/or spatial differences among them that can be exploited by a malicious party to extract information of the key. In this work we characterize, and experimentally verify, a side-channel attack on spatially distinguishable states against free-space QKD systems with misaligned laser sources. Specifically, for those emitting Gaussian beams, which is the most common case in free-space QKD. The attack makes theoretically unsafe any QKD system with any angular misalignment between the laser sources. Finally, we propose two countermeasures to eliminate the spatial distinguishability and secure the key exchange.
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spelling doaj.art-83382745cc6240c7bc596f5aae53e8c92022-12-22T03:58:56ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362022-01-0110826978270510.1109/ACCESS.2022.31966779850989Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and CountermeasuresPablo Arteaga-Diaz0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8281-8353Daniel Cano1Veronica Fernandez2Spanish National Research Council(CSIC), Institute of Physical and Information Technologies, Madrid, SpainSpanish National Research Council(CSIC), Institute of Physical and Information Technologies, Madrid, SpainSpanish National Research Council(CSIC), Institute of Physical and Information Technologies, Madrid, SpainPractical implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols can introduce additional degrees of freedom in the quantum states that may render them distinguishable to an eavesdropper. This is the case of QKD systems using a different laser source to generate each quantum state, which can lead to temporal, spectral and/or spatial differences among them that can be exploited by a malicious party to extract information of the key. In this work we characterize, and experimentally verify, a side-channel attack on spatially distinguishable states against free-space QKD systems with misaligned laser sources. Specifically, for those emitting Gaussian beams, which is the most common case in free-space QKD. The attack makes theoretically unsafe any QKD system with any angular misalignment between the laser sources. Finally, we propose two countermeasures to eliminate the spatial distinguishability and secure the key exchange.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9850989/Countermeasuresfree-space QKDquantum key distributionside-channel attackspatial distinguishability
spellingShingle Pablo Arteaga-Diaz
Daniel Cano
Veronica Fernandez
Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures
IEEE Access
Countermeasures
free-space QKD
quantum key distribution
side-channel attack
spatial distinguishability
title Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures
title_full Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures
title_fullStr Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures
title_full_unstemmed Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures
title_short Practical Side-Channel Attack on Free-Space QKD Systems With Misaligned Sources and Countermeasures
title_sort practical side channel attack on free space qkd systems with misaligned sources and countermeasures
topic Countermeasures
free-space QKD
quantum key distribution
side-channel attack
spatial distinguishability
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9850989/
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AT veronicafernandez practicalsidechannelattackonfreespaceqkdsystemswithmisalignedsourcesandcountermeasures