| Summary: | Theories of trust
distinguish general trust in situations of social uncertainty from
assurance-based trust in committed, long-term relationships. This study
investigates European-Japanese differences using the Centipede game, in which
two players choose between cooperation and defection. The game models repeated
reciprocal interactions, necessitating assurance-based trust to sustain
cooperation. We included game conditions offering players the option of
purchasing commitment-enhancing tools to increase social certainty. Japanese
participants were more cooperative than Europeans, confirming higher
assurance-based trust, and also purchased more commitment-enhancing tools,
demonstrating their preferences for social certainty. Purchase of
commitment-enhancing tools improved cooperativeness in both groups. However, if
co-players refused tool purchase, the Japanese appeared to interpret this as
non-cooperative intent and cooperativeness in the respective games
decreased.
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