Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm
In the context of a normative concretisation of the statute, the term “statute” is not synonymous with the law that can be repeated in light of a concrete case. In this context, the interpreter is the one who (1) “reconstructs” the possibilities contained in the statute, (2) articulates more precise...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Sciendo
2016-12-01
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| Series: | Baltic Journal of Law & Politics |
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| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2016-0011 |
| _version_ | 1818689211515011072 |
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| author | Pavčnik Marijan |
| author_facet | Pavčnik Marijan |
| author_sort | Pavčnik Marijan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the context of a normative concretisation of the statute, the term “statute” is not synonymous with the law that can be repeated in light of a concrete case. In this context, the interpreter is the one who (1) “reconstructs” the possibilities contained in the statute, (2) articulates more precisely the contents of these possibilities, and (3) chooses the combination of possibilities that corresponds most closely to the legally relevant features of the life case (which also must be interpreted). Thus the interpreter’s productivity consists in recognizing a legal provision as referring to a type of conduct − for example, as recognizing that the statutory signs “exceeding the speed limit” refer to, inter alia, a type of behaviour known as driving a car too fast through a town. Moreover, the decision-maker has decided the case just this way, which means it is the decision-maker and not the “statutory text” that has excluded the possibility of any other legal solution (e. g. of driving too fast in a state of emergency). The statute refers to cases that will only occur in the future and are at the present moment, in a more or less defined way, envisaged by the legislator. Irrespective of the extent and intensiveness of the envisaging, the interpretation must remain true to the core meaning of the norm and to the semantic possibilities of the statute text. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-17T12:06:30Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-83c888a73c3d4f3197fcdaf819fb4272 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2029-0454 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-17T12:06:30Z |
| publishDate | 2016-12-01 |
| publisher | Sciendo |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Baltic Journal of Law & Politics |
| spelling | doaj.art-83c888a73c3d4f3197fcdaf819fb42722022-12-21T21:49:37ZengSciendoBaltic Journal of Law & Politics2029-04542016-12-0192435510.1515/bjlp-2016-0011bjlp-2016-0011Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal NormPavčnik Marijan0Professor; Ph.D., University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Law (Slovenia)In the context of a normative concretisation of the statute, the term “statute” is not synonymous with the law that can be repeated in light of a concrete case. In this context, the interpreter is the one who (1) “reconstructs” the possibilities contained in the statute, (2) articulates more precisely the contents of these possibilities, and (3) chooses the combination of possibilities that corresponds most closely to the legally relevant features of the life case (which also must be interpreted). Thus the interpreter’s productivity consists in recognizing a legal provision as referring to a type of conduct − for example, as recognizing that the statutory signs “exceeding the speed limit” refer to, inter alia, a type of behaviour known as driving a car too fast through a town. Moreover, the decision-maker has decided the case just this way, which means it is the decision-maker and not the “statutory text” that has excluded the possibility of any other legal solution (e. g. of driving too fast in a state of emergency). The statute refers to cases that will only occur in the future and are at the present moment, in a more or less defined way, envisaged by the legislator. Irrespective of the extent and intensiveness of the envisaging, the interpretation must remain true to the core meaning of the norm and to the semantic possibilities of the statute text.https://doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2016-0011interpretationvalue (re)construction of legal normdynamic objective interpretationtextualismteleological interpretationlegal reasoninglegal study |
| spellingShingle | Pavčnik Marijan Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm Baltic Journal of Law & Politics interpretation value (re)construction of legal norm dynamic objective interpretation textualism teleological interpretation legal reasoning legal study |
| title | Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm |
| title_full | Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm |
| title_fullStr | Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm |
| title_full_unstemmed | Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm |
| title_short | Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm |
| title_sort | interpretation as a value re construction of the legal norm |
| topic | interpretation value (re)construction of legal norm dynamic objective interpretation textualism teleological interpretation legal reasoning legal study |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2016-0011 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pavcnikmarijan interpretationasavaluereconstructionofthelegalnorm |