Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets

Many Bolivians engage in corruption through intermediaries, like civil society representatives and lawyers, instead of paying officials directly. People vocally resent that intermediaries add an extra layer of costs and opaqueness to corruption but still choose to pay bribes through intermediaries t...

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Main Author: Calla Hummel
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Cambridge University Press 2018-06-01
Series:Latin American Research Review
Online Access:https://larrlasa.org/articles/342
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author Calla Hummel
author_facet Calla Hummel
author_sort Calla Hummel
collection DOAJ
description Many Bolivians engage in corruption through intermediaries, like civil society representatives and lawyers, instead of paying officials directly. People vocally resent that intermediaries add an extra layer of costs and opaqueness to corruption but still choose to pay bribes through intermediaries that knowingly take advantage of them. Why do intermediaries facilitate corruption? While other studies on corrupt intermediaries find that they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, this study contributes to corruption research by finding that intermediaries engage in cartel-like behavior by disproportionally helping officials and intentionally increasing uncertainty and costs for the average citizen. Ethnographic evidence from street markets in La Paz demonstrates that civil society actors like street vendors’ union representatives advance their careers by collecting and delivering bribes to specific bureaucrats. Collusive relationships between bureaucrats and intermediaries hide and perpetuate corruption, while giving the appearance of a transparent government that is responsive to civil society. Resumen Bastante bolivianos se involucran en la corrupción a través de intermediarios, como líderes de la sociedad civil y abogados, en vez de pagar funcionarios directamente. Ciudadanos no les gustan que los intermediarios agregan costos extras y opacidad a la corrupción, pero aún así eligen pagar coimas a través de intermediarios que se aprovechan de ellos. ¿Por qué los intermediarios de la sociedad civil facilitan la corrupción? Mientras otros estudios sobre intermediarios corruptos encuentran que los intermediarios reducen la incertidumbre y los costos de transacción, este estudio encuentra que los intermediarios participan en carteles de coimas, porque ayudan desproporcionadamente a los funcionarios y aumentan intencionalmente la incertidumbre y los costos para ciudadanos. Evidencia etnográfica original de los mercados populares de La Paz demuestra que los actores de la sociedad civil, como los líderes sindicales de los comerciantes populares, avanzan en sus carreras colectando y entregando coimas a funcionarios. Las relaciones colusorias entre los burócratas y los intermediarios de la sociedad civil ocultan y perpetúan la corrupción. Al mismo tiempo, les dan la apariencia de un gobierno transparente que responde a la sociedad civil.
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spelling doaj.art-83cba4b27b304796a4cc8f39e60b35ac2022-12-22T03:27:10ZengCambridge University PressLatin American Research Review0023-87911542-42782018-06-0153221723010.25222/larr.342130Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street MarketsCalla Hummel0University of MiamiMany Bolivians engage in corruption through intermediaries, like civil society representatives and lawyers, instead of paying officials directly. People vocally resent that intermediaries add an extra layer of costs and opaqueness to corruption but still choose to pay bribes through intermediaries that knowingly take advantage of them. Why do intermediaries facilitate corruption? While other studies on corrupt intermediaries find that they reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, this study contributes to corruption research by finding that intermediaries engage in cartel-like behavior by disproportionally helping officials and intentionally increasing uncertainty and costs for the average citizen. Ethnographic evidence from street markets in La Paz demonstrates that civil society actors like street vendors’ union representatives advance their careers by collecting and delivering bribes to specific bureaucrats. Collusive relationships between bureaucrats and intermediaries hide and perpetuate corruption, while giving the appearance of a transparent government that is responsive to civil society. Resumen Bastante bolivianos se involucran en la corrupción a través de intermediarios, como líderes de la sociedad civil y abogados, en vez de pagar funcionarios directamente. Ciudadanos no les gustan que los intermediarios agregan costos extras y opacidad a la corrupción, pero aún así eligen pagar coimas a través de intermediarios que se aprovechan de ellos. ¿Por qué los intermediarios de la sociedad civil facilitan la corrupción? Mientras otros estudios sobre intermediarios corruptos encuentran que los intermediarios reducen la incertidumbre y los costos de transacción, este estudio encuentra que los intermediarios participan en carteles de coimas, porque ayudan desproporcionadamente a los funcionarios y aumentan intencionalmente la incertidumbre y los costos para ciudadanos. Evidencia etnográfica original de los mercados populares de La Paz demuestra que los actores de la sociedad civil, como los líderes sindicales de los comerciantes populares, avanzan en sus carreras colectando y entregando coimas a funcionarios. Las relaciones colusorias entre los burócratas y los intermediarios de la sociedad civil ocultan y perpetúan la corrupción. Al mismo tiempo, les dan la apariencia de un gobierno transparente que responde a la sociedad civil.https://larrlasa.org/articles/342
spellingShingle Calla Hummel
Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets
Latin American Research Review
title Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets
title_full Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets
title_fullStr Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets
title_full_unstemmed Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets
title_short Bribery Cartels: Collusive Corruption in Bolivian Street Markets
title_sort bribery cartels collusive corruption in bolivian street markets
url https://larrlasa.org/articles/342
work_keys_str_mv AT callahummel briberycartelscollusivecorruptioninbolivianstreetmarkets