No-vaxxers are different in public good games

Abstract In September 2021 we conducted a survey to 1482 people in Italy, when the vaccination campaign against Covid19 was going on. In the first part of the survey we run three simple tests on players’ behavior in standard tasks with monetary incentives to measure their risk attitudes, willingness...

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Main Authors: Marcello Basili, Alessio Muscillo, Paolo Pin
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Nature Portfolio 2022-10-01
Series:Scientific Reports
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-22390-y
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author Marcello Basili
Alessio Muscillo
Paolo Pin
author_facet Marcello Basili
Alessio Muscillo
Paolo Pin
author_sort Marcello Basili
collection DOAJ
description Abstract In September 2021 we conducted a survey to 1482 people in Italy, when the vaccination campaign against Covid19 was going on. In the first part of the survey we run three simple tests on players’ behavior in standard tasks with monetary incentives to measure their risk attitudes, willingness to contribute to a public good in an experimental game, and their beliefs about others’ behavior. In the second part, we asked respondents if they were vaccinated and, if not, for what reason. We classified as no-vaxxers those (around $$12\%$$ 12 % of the sample) who did not yet start the vaccination process and declared that they intended not to do it in the future. We find that no-vaxxers contribute less to the public good in the experimental game because they trust others less to do so. from the three tests we extrapolated a classification based on the benchmark of rationality and other-regarding preferences for each respondent, and we found that in this respect no-vaxxers do not differ from the rest of the population.
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spelling doaj.art-84753f6ca0b440b2a79786f23e8e3db92022-12-22T03:53:47ZengNature PortfolioScientific Reports2045-23222022-10-011211810.1038/s41598-022-22390-yNo-vaxxers are different in public good gamesMarcello Basili0Alessio Muscillo1Paolo Pin2Department of Economics and Statistics, Università di SienaDepartment of Economics and Statistics, Università di SienaDepartment of Economics and Statistics, Università di SienaAbstract In September 2021 we conducted a survey to 1482 people in Italy, when the vaccination campaign against Covid19 was going on. In the first part of the survey we run three simple tests on players’ behavior in standard tasks with monetary incentives to measure their risk attitudes, willingness to contribute to a public good in an experimental game, and their beliefs about others’ behavior. In the second part, we asked respondents if they were vaccinated and, if not, for what reason. We classified as no-vaxxers those (around $$12\%$$ 12 % of the sample) who did not yet start the vaccination process and declared that they intended not to do it in the future. We find that no-vaxxers contribute less to the public good in the experimental game because they trust others less to do so. from the three tests we extrapolated a classification based on the benchmark of rationality and other-regarding preferences for each respondent, and we found that in this respect no-vaxxers do not differ from the rest of the population.https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-22390-y
spellingShingle Marcello Basili
Alessio Muscillo
Paolo Pin
No-vaxxers are different in public good games
Scientific Reports
title No-vaxxers are different in public good games
title_full No-vaxxers are different in public good games
title_fullStr No-vaxxers are different in public good games
title_full_unstemmed No-vaxxers are different in public good games
title_short No-vaxxers are different in public good games
title_sort no vaxxers are different in public good games
url https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-22390-y
work_keys_str_mv AT marcellobasili novaxxersaredifferentinpublicgoodgames
AT alessiomuscillo novaxxersaredifferentinpublicgoodgames
AT paolopin novaxxersaredifferentinpublicgoodgames