Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences
We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
2018-12-01
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| Series: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
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| Online Access: |
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v003-1/p_04.pdf
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| Summary: | We consider house allocation with existing tenants in which each agent has dichotomous preferences. We present strategyproof, polynomial-time, and (strongly) individually rational algorithms that satisfy the maximum number of agents. For the endowment only model, one of the algorithms also returns a core-stable allocation. |
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| ISSN: | 2399-844X 2399-8458 |