Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma
We used psychological methods to investigate how two prominent interventions, participatory decision making and enforcement, influence voluntary cooperation in a common-pool resource dilemma. Groups (N=40) harvested resources from a shared resource pool. Individuals in the Voted-Enforce condition v...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2015-11-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15529/jdm15529.pdf |
| _version_ | 1827843095009427456 |
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| author | Daniel A. DeCaro Marco A. Janssen Allen Lee |
| author_facet | Daniel A. DeCaro Marco A. Janssen Allen Lee |
| author_sort | Daniel A. DeCaro |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We used psychological
methods to investigate how two prominent interventions, participatory decision
making and enforcement, influence voluntary cooperation in a common-pool
resource dilemma. Groups (N=40) harvested resources from a shared resource
pool. Individuals in the Voted-Enforce condition voted on conservation rules
and could use economic sanctions to enforce them. In other conditions,
individuals could not vote (Imposed-Enforce condition), lacked enforcement
(Voted condition), or both (Imposed condition). Cooperation was strongest in
the Voted-Enforce condition (Phase 2). Moreover, these groups continued to
cooperate voluntarily after enforcement was removed later in the experiment.
Cooperation was weakest in the Imposed-Enforce condition and degraded after
enforcement ceased. Thus, enforcement improved voluntary cooperation only when
individuals voted. Perceptions of procedural justice, self-determination, and
security were highest in the Voted-Enforced condition. These factors
(legitimacy, security) increased voluntary cooperation by promoting rule
acceptance and internalized motivation. Voted-Enforce participants also felt
closer to one another (i.e., self-other merging), further contributing to their
cooperation. Neither voting nor enforcement produced these sustained
psychological conditions alone. Voting lacked security without enforcement
(Voted condition), so the individuals who disliked the rule (i.e., the losing
voters) pillaged the resource. Enforcement lacked legitimacy without voting
(Imposed-Enforce condition), so it crowded out internal reasons for
cooperation. Governance interventions should carefully promote security without
stifling fundamental needs (e.g., procedural justice) or undermining internal
motives for cooperation. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:20:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-855d2cd4c1fb4c0386becd33e8a41061 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T08:20:52Z |
| publishDate | 2015-11-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-855d2cd4c1fb4c0386becd33e8a410612023-09-02T18:32:54ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752015-11-01106511537Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemmaDaniel A. DeCaroMarco A. JanssenAllen LeeWe used psychological methods to investigate how two prominent interventions, participatory decision making and enforcement, influence voluntary cooperation in a common-pool resource dilemma. Groups (N=40) harvested resources from a shared resource pool. Individuals in the Voted-Enforce condition voted on conservation rules and could use economic sanctions to enforce them. In other conditions, individuals could not vote (Imposed-Enforce condition), lacked enforcement (Voted condition), or both (Imposed condition). Cooperation was strongest in the Voted-Enforce condition (Phase 2). Moreover, these groups continued to cooperate voluntarily after enforcement was removed later in the experiment. Cooperation was weakest in the Imposed-Enforce condition and degraded after enforcement ceased. Thus, enforcement improved voluntary cooperation only when individuals voted. Perceptions of procedural justice, self-determination, and security were highest in the Voted-Enforced condition. These factors (legitimacy, security) increased voluntary cooperation by promoting rule acceptance and internalized motivation. Voted-Enforce participants also felt closer to one another (i.e., self-other merging), further contributing to their cooperation. Neither voting nor enforcement produced these sustained psychological conditions alone. Voting lacked security without enforcement (Voted condition), so the individuals who disliked the rule (i.e., the losing voters) pillaged the resource. Enforcement lacked legitimacy without voting (Imposed-Enforce condition), so it crowded out internal reasons for cooperation. Governance interventions should carefully promote security without stifling fundamental needs (e.g., procedural justice) or undermining internal motives for cooperation.http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15529/jdm15529.pdfcooperation internalized motivation institutional acceptance resource dilemma social dilemma voting sanctions motivational crowding procedural justice self-determination self-other merging.NAKeywords |
| spellingShingle | Daniel A. DeCaro Marco A. Janssen Allen Lee Synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma Judgment and Decision Making cooperation internalized motivation institutional acceptance resource dilemma social dilemma voting sanctions motivational crowding procedural justice self-determination self-other merging.NAKeywords |
| title | Synergistic effects
of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource
dilemma |
| title_full | Synergistic effects
of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource
dilemma |
| title_fullStr | Synergistic effects
of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource
dilemma |
| title_full_unstemmed | Synergistic effects
of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource
dilemma |
| title_short | Synergistic effects
of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource
dilemma |
| title_sort | synergistic effects of voting and enforcement on internalized motivation to cooperate in a resource dilemma |
| topic | cooperation internalized motivation institutional acceptance resource dilemma social dilemma voting sanctions motivational crowding procedural justice self-determination self-other merging.NAKeywords |
| url | http://journal.sjdm.org/15/15529/jdm15529.pdf |
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