Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s Vindication of the Material Component of Cognition
In this paper I present Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s philosophy of science, which he developed as a critical response to the Neo-Kantians. Frischeisen-Köhler drew on insights from both his teacher Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl. In the first four sections I examine Frischeisen-Köhler’s criticism of...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Éditions Kimé
2016-02-01
|
| Series: | Philosophia Scientiæ |
| Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/1158 |
| Summary: | In this paper I present Max Frischeisen-Köhler’s philosophy of science, which he developed as a critical response to the Neo-Kantians. Frischeisen-Köhler drew on insights from both his teacher Wilhelm Dilthey and Edmund Husserl. In the first four sections I examine Frischeisen-Köhler’s criticism of Marburg and Southwestern Neo-Kantianism. This criticism revolves around the view that reality factors into cognition as a fully independent element that cognition must acknowledge and can never construct out of its own intrinsic lawfulness. In the fifth section I focus on Frischeisen-Köhler’s “phenomenology”. His main thesis is that reality is experienced as such in action in such a way that our consciousness of reality does not stem from theoretical considerations about the hypothetical causes of our sensations but from our transactions in the world as agents. Science is thus founded on this pre-scientific experience of reality. I conclude with a criticism of Frischeisen-Köhler’s distinction between consciousness in general and individual subjectivity from a phenomenological viewpoint. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1281-2463 1775-4283 |