In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior
This study examines experimental evidence showing how ethics power allocation mechanisms affect an individual’s in-organization resource division and ethical behavior. We used two two-stage lab experiments to explore power seeking and usage; the experiments contained two stages of power contending a...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2021-12-01
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Series: | Behavioral Sciences |
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Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-328X/12/1/6 |
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author | Yudan Pang Xuefeng Wang Hang Wu Fanfan Zhang |
author_facet | Yudan Pang Xuefeng Wang Hang Wu Fanfan Zhang |
author_sort | Yudan Pang |
collection | DOAJ |
description | This study examines experimental evidence showing how ethics power allocation mechanisms affect an individual’s in-organization resource division and ethical behavior. We used two two-stage lab experiments to explore power seeking and usage; the experiments contained two stages of power contending and power usage. Stage one used two different power-seeking mechanisms in the honesty game. Stage two was based on the dictator game and the ultimatum game to measure an individual’s power usage. The results show that the decisions taken by power-holders could influence the optimization of collective resources, and power-holders who gain power with unethical methods could result in collective resource allocation inequities. With more balanced in-organization power, members tend to be more honest. Subjects also adjust their unethical behavior to adapt to the environment, which could cause the diffusion of unethical behavior. This paper re-designed the dictator game and the ultimatum game by adding an ethically vulnerable power acquisition mechanism. For organizations to prevent the disproportionate dispersion of resources and achieve more public benefits, it is meaningful for managers to create a proper in-organization ethical power allocation mechanism. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-10T01:55:05Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-85bc0cbe7b1d4b629ab30ecbef1369bd |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 2076-328X |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-10T01:55:05Z |
publishDate | 2021-12-01 |
publisher | MDPI AG |
record_format | Article |
series | Behavioral Sciences |
spelling | doaj.art-85bc0cbe7b1d4b629ab30ecbef1369bd2023-11-23T12:58:42ZengMDPI AGBehavioral Sciences2076-328X2021-12-01121610.3390/bs12010006In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making BehaviorYudan Pang0Xuefeng Wang1Hang Wu2Fanfan Zhang3School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaSchool of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaSchool of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaSchool of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, ChinaThis study examines experimental evidence showing how ethics power allocation mechanisms affect an individual’s in-organization resource division and ethical behavior. We used two two-stage lab experiments to explore power seeking and usage; the experiments contained two stages of power contending and power usage. Stage one used two different power-seeking mechanisms in the honesty game. Stage two was based on the dictator game and the ultimatum game to measure an individual’s power usage. The results show that the decisions taken by power-holders could influence the optimization of collective resources, and power-holders who gain power with unethical methods could result in collective resource allocation inequities. With more balanced in-organization power, members tend to be more honest. Subjects also adjust their unethical behavior to adapt to the environment, which could cause the diffusion of unethical behavior. This paper re-designed the dictator game and the ultimatum game by adding an ethically vulnerable power acquisition mechanism. For organizations to prevent the disproportionate dispersion of resources and achieve more public benefits, it is meaningful for managers to create a proper in-organization ethical power allocation mechanism.https://www.mdpi.com/2076-328X/12/1/6power allocation mechanismsdishonesty behaviordecision makingultimatum gamedictator gameorganization behavior |
spellingShingle | Yudan Pang Xuefeng Wang Hang Wu Fanfan Zhang In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior Behavioral Sciences power allocation mechanisms dishonesty behavior decision making ultimatum game dictator game organization behavior |
title | In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior |
title_full | In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior |
title_fullStr | In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior |
title_full_unstemmed | In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior |
title_short | In-Organization Ethics Power-Allocation Mechanisms and Members’ Decision-Making Behavior |
title_sort | in organization ethics power allocation mechanisms and members decision making behavior |
topic | power allocation mechanisms dishonesty behavior decision making ultimatum game dictator game organization behavior |
url | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-328X/12/1/6 |
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