Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks
In the study of power control and allocation based on pricing, the utility of secondary users is usually studied from the perspective of the signal to noise ratio. The study of secondary user utility from the perspective of communication demand can not only promote the secondary users to meet the ma...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2017-01-01
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| Series: | Sensors |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/1/101 |
| _version_ | 1811305526873554944 |
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| author | Biqing Zeng Chi Zhang Pianpian Hu Shengyu Wang |
| author_facet | Biqing Zeng Chi Zhang Pianpian Hu Shengyu Wang |
| author_sort | Biqing Zeng |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the study of power control and allocation based on pricing, the utility of secondary users is usually studied from the perspective of the signal to noise ratio. The study of secondary user utility from the perspective of communication demand can not only promote the secondary users to meet the maximum communication needs, but also to maximize the utilization of spectrum resources, however, research in this area is lacking, so from the viewpoint of meeting the demand of network communication, this paper designs a two stage model to solve spectrum leasing and allocation problem in cognitive radio sensor networks (CRSNs). In the first stage, the secondary base station collects the secondary network communication requirements, and rents spectrum resources from several primary base stations using the Bertrand game to model the transaction behavior of the primary base station and secondary base station. The second stage, the subcarriers and power allocation problem of secondary base stations is defined as a nonlinear programming problem to be solved based on Nash bargaining. The simulation results show that the proposed model can satisfy the communication requirements of each user in a fair and efficient way compared to other spectrum sharing schemes. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T08:28:03Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-865a3cacf12748b980f26e5338131cc4 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1424-8220 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T08:28:03Z |
| publishDate | 2017-01-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Sensors |
| spelling | doaj.art-865a3cacf12748b980f26e5338131cc42022-12-22T02:54:23ZengMDPI AGSensors1424-82202017-01-0117110110.3390/s17010101s17010101Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor NetworksBiqing Zeng0Chi Zhang1Pianpian Hu2Shengyu Wang3School of Computing, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510631, ChinaIFLYTEK Co., Ltd., Hefei 230000, ChinaSchool of Computing, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510631, ChinaSchool of Computing, South China Normal University, Guangzhou 510631, ChinaIn the study of power control and allocation based on pricing, the utility of secondary users is usually studied from the perspective of the signal to noise ratio. The study of secondary user utility from the perspective of communication demand can not only promote the secondary users to meet the maximum communication needs, but also to maximize the utilization of spectrum resources, however, research in this area is lacking, so from the viewpoint of meeting the demand of network communication, this paper designs a two stage model to solve spectrum leasing and allocation problem in cognitive radio sensor networks (CRSNs). In the first stage, the secondary base station collects the secondary network communication requirements, and rents spectrum resources from several primary base stations using the Bertrand game to model the transaction behavior of the primary base station and secondary base station. The second stage, the subcarriers and power allocation problem of secondary base stations is defined as a nonlinear programming problem to be solved based on Nash bargaining. The simulation results show that the proposed model can satisfy the communication requirements of each user in a fair and efficient way compared to other spectrum sharing schemes.http://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/1/101wireless sensor networkspectrum leasingspectrum allocationspectrum pricingBertrand game |
| spellingShingle | Biqing Zeng Chi Zhang Pianpian Hu Shengyu Wang Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks Sensors wireless sensor network spectrum leasing spectrum allocation spectrum pricing Bertrand game |
| title | Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks |
| title_full | Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks |
| title_fullStr | Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks |
| title_short | Spectrum Sharing Based on a Bertrand Game in Cognitive Radio Sensor Networks |
| title_sort | spectrum sharing based on a bertrand game in cognitive radio sensor networks |
| topic | wireless sensor network spectrum leasing spectrum allocation spectrum pricing Bertrand game |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/17/1/101 |
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