Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes
Abstract Fitting multivariate models to the China Private Enterprises Survey (2006) data, this article reveals the differentiation of state-business relationship as a function of a private enterprise’s economic capital, thereby to a certain extend challenges the dominant paradigm of clientelism. Whe...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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SpringerOpen
2019-01-01
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| Series: | The Journal of Chinese Sociology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40711-018-0091-8 |
| _version_ | 1811329465773457408 |
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| author | Yingying Ji Xiaoguang Fan |
| author_facet | Yingying Ji Xiaoguang Fan |
| author_sort | Yingying Ji |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract Fitting multivariate models to the China Private Enterprises Survey (2006) data, this article reveals the differentiation of state-business relationship as a function of a private enterprise’s economic capital, thereby to a certain extend challenges the dominant paradigm of clientelism. When resolving disputes with the government, private enterprises with more economic capital are more likely to directly contact the government agency, displaying greater political privilege. On the other hand, private enterprises with middle-range economic capital show higher preference to take advantage of business associations or particularistic relationships. However, instead of economic capital, it is the Communist Party membership of private entrepreneurs that influences their contentious strategies. There is also regional variation in the selection of strategies. This article casts doubt on the existence of a “capitalist class” in China. Under the specific context of the Chinese society, characteristics of the private economy influence the path by which economic power transforms to political power. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T15:44:17Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-8711197c2e614b1eb37bde998cae1047 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2198-2635 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T15:44:17Z |
| publishDate | 2019-01-01 |
| publisher | SpringerOpen |
| record_format | Article |
| series | The Journal of Chinese Sociology |
| spelling | doaj.art-8711197c2e614b1eb37bde998cae10472022-12-22T02:41:02ZengSpringerOpenThe Journal of Chinese Sociology2198-26352019-01-016112010.1186/s40711-018-0091-8Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputesYingying Ji0Xiaoguang Fan1Shanghai UniversityZhejiang UniversityAbstract Fitting multivariate models to the China Private Enterprises Survey (2006) data, this article reveals the differentiation of state-business relationship as a function of a private enterprise’s economic capital, thereby to a certain extend challenges the dominant paradigm of clientelism. When resolving disputes with the government, private enterprises with more economic capital are more likely to directly contact the government agency, displaying greater political privilege. On the other hand, private enterprises with middle-range economic capital show higher preference to take advantage of business associations or particularistic relationships. However, instead of economic capital, it is the Communist Party membership of private entrepreneurs that influences their contentious strategies. There is also regional variation in the selection of strategies. This article casts doubt on the existence of a “capitalist class” in China. Under the specific context of the Chinese society, characteristics of the private economy influence the path by which economic power transforms to political power.http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40711-018-0091-8Economic capitalClientelismState-business relationshipBargaining powerBusiness associations |
| spellingShingle | Yingying Ji Xiaoguang Fan Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes The Journal of Chinese Sociology Economic capital Clientelism State-business relationship Bargaining power Business associations |
| title | Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes |
| title_full | Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes |
| title_fullStr | Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes |
| title_short | Do deep pockets have more political influence?—the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes |
| title_sort | do deep pockets have more political influence the size of private enterprises and their strategy selection in resolving administrative disputes |
| topic | Economic capital Clientelism State-business relationship Bargaining power Business associations |
| url | http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s40711-018-0091-8 |
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