Distributed loci of control: Overcoming stale dichotomies in biology and cognitive science
We argue that theoretical debates in biology and cognitive science often are based around differences in the posited locus of control for biological and cognitive phenomena. Internalists about locus of control posit that specific causal control over the phenomenon is exerted by factors internal (to...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
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Mimesis Edizioni, Milano
2023-08-01
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| Series: | Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.rifp.it/ojs/index.php/rifp/article/view/rifp.2023.0008 |
| Summary: | We argue that theoretical debates in biology and cognitive science often are based around differences in the posited locus of control for biological and cognitive phenomena. Internalists about locus of control posit that specific causal control over the phenomenon is exerted by factors internal (to the relevant subsystem) of an organism. Externalists posit that causally specific influence is due to external factors. In theoretical biology, we suggest, a minimal agreement has developed that the locus of control for heritable variation is distributed – that is, both internal and external factors exert specific, non-redundant causal influence on evolved traits. We suggest that debates in cognitive science, particularly surrounding “enactivism”, should also embrace a distributed locus of control. We show how both internal and external factors contribute non-redundantly to psychological capacities and behavior. We further suggest that embracing a distributed locus of control provides a basis for a revisionary, but substantive account of “mental representation”. |
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| ISSN: | 2039-4667 2239-2629 |