Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of Reasons
John Woods and Brent Hudak’s theory on arguments by analogy (1989), although correct in its meta-argumentative approach, gives rise to problems when we consider the possibility of weighing reasons. I contend that this is an outcome of construing the relationship between the premises and the conclus...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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University of Windsor
2022-12-01
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| Series: | Informal Logic |
| Online Access: | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/7143 |
| _version_ | 1811184261493948416 |
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| author | José Alhambra |
| author_facet | José Alhambra |
| author_sort | José Alhambra |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description |
John Woods and Brent Hudak’s theory on arguments by analogy (1989), although correct in its meta-argumentative approach, gives rise to problems when we consider the possibility of weighing reasons. I contend that this is an outcome of construing the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of arguments compared in argumentation by analogy as inferences. An interpretation in terms of reasons is proposed here. The reasons-based approach solves these problems and allows the theory to be extended to account for a particular variant of argumentation by analogy in which the subjects of comparison are not arguments, but weighings of reasons.
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| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T13:09:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-87cbf54ad9bd48d1883573dc612bc3f7 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0824-2577 2293-734X |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T13:09:21Z |
| publishDate | 2022-12-01 |
| publisher | University of Windsor |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Informal Logic |
| spelling | doaj.art-87cbf54ad9bd48d1883573dc612bc3f72022-12-22T04:22:37ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25772293-734X2022-12-0142410.22329/il.v42i4.7143Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of ReasonsJosé Alhambra0Autonomous University of Madrid John Woods and Brent Hudak’s theory on arguments by analogy (1989), although correct in its meta-argumentative approach, gives rise to problems when we consider the possibility of weighing reasons. I contend that this is an outcome of construing the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of arguments compared in argumentation by analogy as inferences. An interpretation in terms of reasons is proposed here. The reasons-based approach solves these problems and allows the theory to be extended to account for a particular variant of argumentation by analogy in which the subjects of comparison are not arguments, but weighings of reasons. https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/7143 |
| spellingShingle | José Alhambra Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of Reasons Informal Logic |
| title | Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of Reasons |
| title_full | Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of Reasons |
| title_fullStr | Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of Reasons |
| title_full_unstemmed | Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of Reasons |
| title_short | Argumentation by Analogy and Weighing of Reasons |
| title_sort | argumentation by analogy and weighing of reasons |
| url | https://informallogic.ca/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/7143 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT josealhambra argumentationbyanalogyandweighingofreasons |