Moral Passions: A Thomistic Interpretation of Moral Emotions in Nonhuman and Human Animals

Should the many sensibilities and behaviors exhibited by non-human animals similar to humans qualify as morality? While some see non-human social behaviors as a development of human moral behavior, others point out a conspicuous lack of essential components of human morality are altogether set apart...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Jean Porter
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: The Journal of Moral Theology, Inc. 2014-06-01
Series:Journal of Moral Theology
Online Access:https://jmt.scholasticahq.com/article/11268-moral-passions-a-thomistic-interpretation-of-moral-emotions-in-nonhuman-and-human-animals
Description
Summary:Should the many sensibilities and behaviors exhibited by non-human animals similar to humans qualify as morality? While some see non-human social behaviors as a development of human moral behavior, others point out a conspicuous lack of essential components of human morality are altogether set apart from non-human acts. A Thomistic analysis that takes into consideration reason, will, and the passions show that emotions – while indeed indispensable and representing the immediate reaction to our social world – are incomplete for an understanding of man, who utilizes his reason and will to order his initial emotions into morally meaningful acts.
ISSN:2166-2851
2166-2118