Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
Recently, a class of interesting strategies, named extortion strategies, has attracted considerable attention since such extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. In this paper, we investigate the influence of the strategy-selection timescale on the e...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2015-01-01
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| Series: | New Journal of Physics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/17/3/033032 |
| _version_ | 1797751172354801664 |
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| author | Zhihai Rong Zhi-Xi Wu Dong Hao Michael Z Q Chen Tao Zhou |
| author_facet | Zhihai Rong Zhi-Xi Wu Dong Hao Michael Z Q Chen Tao Zhou |
| author_sort | Zhihai Rong |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Recently, a class of interesting strategies, named extortion strategies, has attracted considerable attention since such extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. In this paper, we investigate the influence of the strategy-selection timescale on the evolution of extortion and cooperation in networked systems. Through connecting the lifetime of individuals’ strategies with their fitness, we find that extortioners can form long-term stable relationships with cooperative neighbors, whereas the lifetime of a defection strategy is short according to the myopic best response rule. With the separation of interaction and strategy-updating timescales, the extortioners in a square lattice are able to form stable, cross-like structures with cooperators due to the snowdrift-like relation. In scale-free networks the hubs are most likely occupied by extortioners, who furthermore induce their low-degree neighbors to behave as cooperators. Since extortioners in scale-free networks can meet more cooperators than their counterparts in the square lattice, the latter results in higher average fitness of the whole population than the former. The extortioners play the role of a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and the diversity of strategy-selection timescale furthermore promotes the maintenance of extortioners with cooperators in networked systems. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:44:37Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-89544c7a7cb44ba5a9a551513f7db4db |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1367-2630 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:44:37Z |
| publishDate | 2015-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | New Journal of Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-89544c7a7cb44ba5a9a551513f7db4db2023-08-08T14:18:44ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302015-01-0117303303210.1088/1367-2630/17/3/033032Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma gameZhihai Rong0Zhi-Xi Wu1Dong Hao2Michael Z Q Chen3Tao Zhou4CompleX Lab, Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu 610054, People's Republic of China; Department of Electronic and Information Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University , Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong KongInstitute of Computational Physics and Complex Systems, Lanzhou University , Lanzhou Gansu 730000, People's Republic of ChinaCompleX Lab, Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu 610054, People's Republic of ChinaDepartment of Mechanical Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam , Hong KongCompleX Lab, Web Sciences Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu 610054, People's Republic of China; Big Data Research Center, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China , Chengdu 611731, People's Republic of ChinaRecently, a class of interesting strategies, named extortion strategies, has attracted considerable attention since such extortion strategies can dominate any opponent in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. In this paper, we investigate the influence of the strategy-selection timescale on the evolution of extortion and cooperation in networked systems. Through connecting the lifetime of individuals’ strategies with their fitness, we find that extortioners can form long-term stable relationships with cooperative neighbors, whereas the lifetime of a defection strategy is short according to the myopic best response rule. With the separation of interaction and strategy-updating timescales, the extortioners in a square lattice are able to form stable, cross-like structures with cooperators due to the snowdrift-like relation. In scale-free networks the hubs are most likely occupied by extortioners, who furthermore induce their low-degree neighbors to behave as cooperators. Since extortioners in scale-free networks can meet more cooperators than their counterparts in the square lattice, the latter results in higher average fitness of the whole population than the former. The extortioners play the role of a catalyst for the evolution of cooperation, and the diversity of strategy-selection timescale furthermore promotes the maintenance of extortioners with cooperators in networked systems.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/17/3/033032cooperationcoevolutiontime scale89.75.Fb02.50.Le89.65.-s |
| spellingShingle | Zhihai Rong Zhi-Xi Wu Dong Hao Michael Z Q Chen Tao Zhou Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game New Journal of Physics cooperation coevolution time scale 89.75.Fb 02.50.Le 89.65.-s |
| title | Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game |
| title_full | Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game |
| title_fullStr | Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game |
| title_full_unstemmed | Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game |
| title_short | Diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game |
| title_sort | diversity of timescale promotes the maintenance of extortioners in a spatial prisoner s dilemma game |
| topic | cooperation coevolution time scale 89.75.Fb 02.50.Le 89.65.-s |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/17/3/033032 |
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