Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason
In a posthumous paper, Perelman discusses his decision to bring his theory of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than calling it an informal logic. This is due in part because of the centrality he gives to audience, and in part because of the negative attitude that informal logicians have t...
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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University of Windsor
2008-02-01
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Series: | Informal Logic |
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Online Access: | https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/457 |
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author | Christopher W. Tindale |
author_facet | Christopher W. Tindale |
author_sort | Christopher W. Tindale |
collection | DOAJ |
description | In a posthumous paper, Perelman discusses his decision to bring his theory of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than calling it an informal logic. This is due in part because of the centrality he gives to audience, and in part because of the negative attitude that informal logicians have to rhetoric. In this paper, I explore both of these concerns by way of considering what benefits Perelman’s work can have for informal logic, and what insights the work of informal logicians might bring to the project of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. |
first_indexed | 2024-12-10T06:37:47Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-8ae27f00ca074b9987e572adb88ea60b |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 0824-2577 0824-2577 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-12-10T06:37:47Z |
publishDate | 2008-02-01 |
publisher | University of Windsor |
record_format | Article |
series | Informal Logic |
spelling | doaj.art-8ae27f00ca074b9987e572adb88ea60b2022-12-22T01:58:52ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25770824-25772008-02-0126334135710.22329/il.v26i3.457456Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of ReasonChristopher W. TindaleIn a posthumous paper, Perelman discusses his decision to bring his theory of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than calling it an informal logic. This is due in part because of the centrality he gives to audience, and in part because of the negative attitude that informal logicians have to rhetoric. In this paper, I explore both of these concerns by way of considering what benefits Perelman’s work can have for informal logic, and what insights the work of informal logicians might bring to the project of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/457audience, evaluation, informal logic, historicity of reason, noninteractive audience, Perelman, Reason, rhetoric |
spellingShingle | Christopher W. Tindale Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason Informal Logic audience, evaluation, informal logic, historicity of reason, noninteractive audience, Perelman, Reason, rhetoric |
title | Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason |
title_full | Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason |
title_fullStr | Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason |
title_full_unstemmed | Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason |
title_short | Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason |
title_sort | perelman informal logic and the historicity of reason |
topic | audience, evaluation, informal logic, historicity of reason, noninteractive audience, Perelman, Reason, rhetoric |
url | https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/457 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT christopherwtindale perelmaninformallogicandthehistoricityofreason |