Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason

In a posthumous paper, Perelman discusses his decision to bring his theory of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than calling it an informal logic. This is due in part because of the centrality he gives to audience, and in part because of the negative attitude that informal logicians have t...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Christopher W. Tindale
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of Windsor 2008-02-01
Series:Informal Logic
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/457
_version_ 1828390060546850816
author Christopher W. Tindale
author_facet Christopher W. Tindale
author_sort Christopher W. Tindale
collection DOAJ
description In a posthumous paper, Perelman discusses his decision to bring his theory of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than calling it an informal logic. This is due in part because of the centrality he gives to audience, and in part because of the negative attitude that informal logicians have to rhetoric. In this paper, I explore both of these concerns by way of considering what benefits Perelman’s work can have for informal logic, and what insights the work of informal logicians might bring to the project of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.
first_indexed 2024-12-10T06:37:47Z
format Article
id doaj.art-8ae27f00ca074b9987e572adb88ea60b
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 0824-2577
0824-2577
language English
last_indexed 2024-12-10T06:37:47Z
publishDate 2008-02-01
publisher University of Windsor
record_format Article
series Informal Logic
spelling doaj.art-8ae27f00ca074b9987e572adb88ea60b2022-12-22T01:58:52ZengUniversity of WindsorInformal Logic0824-25770824-25772008-02-0126334135710.22329/il.v26i3.457456Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of ReasonChristopher W. TindaleIn a posthumous paper, Perelman discusses his decision to bring his theory of argumentation together with rhetoric rather than calling it an informal logic. This is due in part because of the centrality he gives to audience, and in part because of the negative attitude that informal logicians have to rhetoric. In this paper, I explore both of these concerns by way of considering what benefits Perelman’s work can have for informal logic, and what insights the work of informal logicians might bring to the project of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca.https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/457audience, evaluation, informal logic, historicity of reason, noninteractive audience, Perelman, Reason, rhetoric
spellingShingle Christopher W. Tindale
Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason
Informal Logic
audience, evaluation, informal logic, historicity of reason, noninteractive audience, Perelman, Reason, rhetoric
title Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason
title_full Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason
title_fullStr Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason
title_full_unstemmed Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason
title_short Perelman, Informal Logic and the Historicity of Reason
title_sort perelman informal logic and the historicity of reason
topic audience, evaluation, informal logic, historicity of reason, noninteractive audience, Perelman, Reason, rhetoric
url https://ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/view/457
work_keys_str_mv AT christopherwtindale perelmaninformallogicandthehistoricityofreason