Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism

Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunct...

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Main Author: Manuel Pérez Otero
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: University of the Basque Country 2013-09-01
Series:Theoria
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/6882
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author Manuel Pérez Otero
author_facet Manuel Pérez Otero
author_sort Manuel Pérez Otero
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description Necessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order contingentism (the negation of necessitism about individuals) and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including some replies to Williamson’s additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pre-theoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all orders (which Williamson mainly defends by invoking considerations of simplicity).
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spelling doaj.art-8b2f29f7692e4d1d849f2ae42087ede42022-12-22T00:20:51ZengUniversity of the Basque CountryTheoria0495-45482171-679X2013-09-0128339340610.1387/theoria.68828095Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order NecessitismManuel Pérez OteroNecessitism about individuals claims that necessarily every individual necessarily exists. An analogous necessitist thesis attributes necessary existence to properties and relations. Both theses have been defended by Williamson. Furthermore, Williamson specifically argues against the hybrid conjunction of first-order contingentism (the negation of necessitism about individuals) and higher-order necessitism; a combination that would bring about additional drawbacks. I work out a defence of the hybrid combination, including some replies to Williamson’s additional objections. Considerations of ontological parsimony and pre-theoretical intuitions favour the hybrid view over necessitism at all orders (which Williamson mainly defends by invoking considerations of simplicity).http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/6882Williamsonontological parsimonypre-theoretical intuitionsBarcan Formulasimplicitypossible worlds semanticsmodal logiccontingentismnecessitism
spellingShingle Manuel Pérez Otero
Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism
Theoria
Williamson
ontological parsimony
pre-theoretical intuitions
Barcan Formula
simplicity
possible worlds semantics
modal logic
contingentism
necessitism
title Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism
title_full Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism
title_fullStr Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism
title_full_unstemmed Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism
title_short Contingentism about Individuals and Higher-Order Necessitism
title_sort contingentism about individuals and higher order necessitism
topic Williamson
ontological parsimony
pre-theoretical intuitions
Barcan Formula
simplicity
possible worlds semantics
modal logic
contingentism
necessitism
url http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/6882
work_keys_str_mv AT manuelperezotero contingentismaboutindividualsandhigherordernecessitism