Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections

In this work we analyze the impact of the voting rule on individual behavior. We use a sample of individuals naturally motivated by real candidates. Then, in our methodology we do not induce preferences. Moreover, up to our knowledge, this is the first work in which both individual behavior and aggr...

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Main Author: Julián Parada
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá) 2011-12-01
Series:Desarrollo y Sociedad
Subjects:
Online Access:http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/revistadys/68/03_Voters.pdf
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author Julián Parada
author_facet Julián Parada
author_sort Julián Parada
collection DOAJ
description In this work we analyze the impact of the voting rule on individual behavior. We use a sample of individuals naturally motivated by real candidates. Then, in our methodology we do not induce preferences. Moreover, up to our knowledge, this is the first work in which both individual behavior and aggregate results are studied with a relatively large sample. We implemented an online simulation during the presidential campaigns for 2010 in Colombia. Voters were asked to submit experimental ballots under four different voting rules: plurality rule, approval voting, Borda rule and majority rule with runoff elections. We compared the observed individual behavior with two benchmarks.The fist one considers sincere voting and the second one instrumental behavior. Our results show that under approval voting and Borda rule we observe a lower level of sincerity and instrumental behavior in comparison to the other two rules. However, both models predict well the aggregate outcomes under all the voting rules.
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spelling doaj.art-8b5e50e05b334e2b971ab7360cc10d832022-12-21T23:45:53ZengUniversidad de los Andes (Bogotá)Desarrollo y Sociedad0120-35841900-77602011-12-0168179118Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential ElectionsJulián ParadaIn this work we analyze the impact of the voting rule on individual behavior. We use a sample of individuals naturally motivated by real candidates. Then, in our methodology we do not induce preferences. Moreover, up to our knowledge, this is the first work in which both individual behavior and aggregate results are studied with a relatively large sample. We implemented an online simulation during the presidential campaigns for 2010 in Colombia. Voters were asked to submit experimental ballots under four different voting rules: plurality rule, approval voting, Borda rule and majority rule with runoff elections. We compared the observed individual behavior with two benchmarks.The fist one considers sincere voting and the second one instrumental behavior. Our results show that under approval voting and Borda rule we observe a lower level of sincerity and instrumental behavior in comparison to the other two rules. However, both models predict well the aggregate outcomes under all the voting rules.http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/revistadys/68/03_Voters.pdfVoting rulesinstrumental strategic voterssincere votingsocial choice.
spellingShingle Julián Parada
Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections
Desarrollo y Sociedad
Voting rules
instrumental strategic voters
sincere voting
social choice.
title Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections
title_full Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections
title_fullStr Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections
title_full_unstemmed Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections
title_short Voters’ Rationality Under Four Electoral Rules: A Simulation Based on the 2010 Colombian Presidential Elections
title_sort voters rationality under four electoral rules a simulation based on the 2010 colombian presidential elections
topic Voting rules
instrumental strategic voters
sincere voting
social choice.
url http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/revistadys/68/03_Voters.pdf
work_keys_str_mv AT julianparada votersrationalityunderfourelectoralrulesasimulationbasedonthe2010colombianpresidentialelections