A pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart grid
Abstract In this paper, a two‐stage pricing framework is proposed for the electricity market which is consisted of a generation company (GC), multiple electric utility companies (EUC) and consumers. In the electricity wholesale market, the EUCs will choose an agent to negotiate the wholesale price w...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Wiley
2021-01-01
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| Series: | IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12013 |
| _version_ | 1828113074973835264 |
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| author | Jie Yang Yachao Dai Kai Ma Hongru Liu Zhixin Liu |
| author_facet | Jie Yang Yachao Dai Kai Ma Hongru Liu Zhixin Liu |
| author_sort | Jie Yang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Abstract In this paper, a two‐stage pricing framework is proposed for the electricity market which is consisted of a generation company (GC), multiple electric utility companies (EUC) and consumers. In the electricity wholesale market, the EUCs will choose an agent to negotiate the wholesale price with GC. An appropriate wholesale price plays an important role in the stable operation of the electricity wholesale market. However, it is challenging to find the optimal wholesale price. Therefore, the Raiffa‐Kalai‐Smorodinsky bargaining solution (RBS) is applied to realize the pricing equilibrium which is 0.3$/KWh. In the electricity retail market, this study designs a retail pricing strategy based on the potential game, which can optimize both social welfare and the benefit of the EUCs. Moreover, the impact of demand disturbance on the benefit of the EUCs and GC is studied in the electricity retail market. Then an iterative pricing algorithm is proposed for the two‐stage pricing model. The simulation results reveal that the demand disturbance has little effect on the benefit of the EUCs and GC, indicating the reliable/promising robustness of the algorithm. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-11T11:59:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-8b64c645b55449b2bb65c3443578d481 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1751-8687 1751-8695 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-11T11:59:52Z |
| publishDate | 2021-01-01 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| record_format | Article |
| series | IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution |
| spelling | doaj.art-8b64c645b55449b2bb65c3443578d4812022-12-22T04:24:53ZengWileyIET Generation, Transmission & Distribution1751-86871751-86952021-01-0115225326310.1049/gtd2.12013A pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart gridJie Yang0Yachao Dai1Kai Ma2Hongru Liu3Zhixin Liu4School of Electrical Engineering Yanshan University Qinhuangdao Hebei Province ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering Yanshan University Qinhuangdao Hebei Province ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering Yanshan University Qinhuangdao Hebei Province ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering Yanshan University Qinhuangdao Hebei Province ChinaSchool of Electrical Engineering Yanshan University Qinhuangdao Hebei Province ChinaAbstract In this paper, a two‐stage pricing framework is proposed for the electricity market which is consisted of a generation company (GC), multiple electric utility companies (EUC) and consumers. In the electricity wholesale market, the EUCs will choose an agent to negotiate the wholesale price with GC. An appropriate wholesale price plays an important role in the stable operation of the electricity wholesale market. However, it is challenging to find the optimal wholesale price. Therefore, the Raiffa‐Kalai‐Smorodinsky bargaining solution (RBS) is applied to realize the pricing equilibrium which is 0.3$/KWh. In the electricity retail market, this study designs a retail pricing strategy based on the potential game, which can optimize both social welfare and the benefit of the EUCs. Moreover, the impact of demand disturbance on the benefit of the EUCs and GC is studied in the electricity retail market. Then an iterative pricing algorithm is proposed for the two‐stage pricing model. The simulation results reveal that the demand disturbance has little effect on the benefit of the EUCs and GC, indicating the reliable/promising robustness of the algorithm.https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12013Optimisation techniquesSystems theory applications in economics and businessGame theoryOptimisation techniquesGame theoryPower system management, operation and economics |
| spellingShingle | Jie Yang Yachao Dai Kai Ma Hongru Liu Zhixin Liu A pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart grid IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution Optimisation techniques Systems theory applications in economics and business Game theory Optimisation techniques Game theory Power system management, operation and economics |
| title | A pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart grid |
| title_full | A pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart grid |
| title_fullStr | A pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart grid |
| title_full_unstemmed | A pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart grid |
| title_short | A pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart grid |
| title_sort | pricing strategy based on potential game and bargaining theory in smart grid |
| topic | Optimisation techniques Systems theory applications in economics and business Game theory Optimisation techniques Game theory Power system management, operation and economics |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1049/gtd2.12013 |
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